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CAUSING THE CONDITIONS OF ONE'S OWN DEFENSE: 
A STUDY IN THE LIMITS OF THEORY 
IN CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINE* 
Paul H. Robinson** 
ONE widely-stated goal of criminal law theory is to create the set of rules that best implements our collective sense of jus-
tice. To reach this goal, the theorist continuously adjusts his the-
ory so that it generates rules that better reflect our fundamental 
notions of justice.' These rules, moreover, must function as worka-
ble doctrine, which in the context of criminal law means precise 
statutory provisions.' 
* This article is based on a paper presented to the German-Angloamerican Workshop on 
Basic Problems in Criminal Law Theory, held at the Max Planck lnstitiit fUr Auslandisches 
und Internationales Strafrecht, Freiburg, West Germany, July 1-21, 1984. The author wishes 
to acknowledge the contributions of J. Grall Robinson to this article. 
** Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. B.S. 1970, Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute; J.D. 1973, University of California at Los Angeles; LL.M. 1974, 
Harvard; Dipl. Leg. St. 1976, Cambridge. 
' Indeed, some would extend the process beyond criminal Jaw. See, e.g., C. Radcliffe, The 
Law and its Compass 63-64 (1960) ("Every system of jurisprudence needs ... a constant 
preoccupation with the task of relating its rules and principles to the fundamental moral 
assumptions of the society to which it belongs."). 
2 This statement is especially true in the United States, where in many states only of-
fenses defined by statute are punishable. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-104(3) (1978); 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 202(a) (1979); Hawaii Rev. Stat.§ 701-102(1) (1976); Ill. Ann. Stat. 
ch. 38, § 1-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:7 (West 1974); Mont. 
Code Ann.§ 45-1-104(2) (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2C:1·5(a) (West 1982); cf. Krulewitch v. 
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 456-57 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (federal criminal prose-
cutions must be based on statutory authority). Similarly, many states abolish all common-
law crimes. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-104(3) (1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.10 (West 
1982); Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-102 (1983). In any event, even if existing common-law offenses may 
be enforced, the commonly accepted "principle of legality" forbids the creation of new ones. 
1 
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It is this process of theoretical refinement and translation that is 
the topic of this article. Can good theory generate results that ap-
proximate our collective sense of justice? Can the theoretical re-
finements be translated into workable statutory provisions? What 
limits the success of the translation? 
As a case study, this article offers a theory to resolve one of the 
more troublesome areas of criminal law: cases where an actor is in 
some way responsible for bringing about the conditions of his own 
defense, such as by provoking another's use of unlawful force 
against him or by causing his own intoxication. As Part I illus-
trates, current law governing such instances is inadequate. It is in-
consistent, frequently irrational, and is a poor approximation of 
our collective sense of justice. Part II offers some basic theoretical 
principles to govern cases of causing the conditions of one's own 
defense. These principles are consistent with well-accepted princi-
ples of liability and exculpation, and they generate results that ac-
cord well with our notions of justice. Nevertheless, dramatic im-
provement in the law can be realized only if the theory can be 
implemented through workable doctrine, as expressed in statutes. 
The statutes proposed here, in fact, face troublesome questions 
about complexity and difficulties of proof. 
Part III examines the extent of these problems and offers possi-
hie solutions. The most promising solutions, however, have their 
own problems of constitutional infirmity. Ultimately, then, the 
confines of the American criminal justice system limit the transla-
tion of good theory into workable doctrine. 
I. CuRRENT LAw TREATMENT oF AN AcTOR WHo BRINGS ABOUT 
THE CoNDITIONS oF His OwN DEFENSE 
Current law generally takes one of several approaches in dealing 
with an actor who brings about the conditions of his own defense, 
and commonly addresses such a situation in relation to five types 
of defenses: the lesser evils justification,' the self-defense justifica-
See generally Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. 
L. Rev. (March 1985) (forthcoming). 
3 A justification defense exculpates an actor who satisfies all elements of an offense defi-
nition under circumstances that create a benefit that outweighs the harm of the of-
fense-either because a greater harm is avoided or because a greater social interest is fur-
thered. "Lesser evils" or "choice of evils" is perhaps the most basic justification defense. It 
involves balancing the harm caused against the harm avoided. An actor who destroys one 
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tion,' the duress excuse,• the general intoxication excuse," and the 
intoxication-based failure of proof "defense."7 
A. Withholding a Defense upon Any Causal Contribution 
Several jurisdictions deny a lesser evils defense whenever an ac-
tor contributes in any way, even without fault, to causing the need 
for the justified conduct.' Thus, if an actor sets a firebreak to min-
house and prevents a fire from consuming a whole town, for example, might have a lesser 
evils defense. See generally Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 
Colum. L. Rev. 199, 213-14 (1982) (discussing lesser evils) [hereinafter cited as Robinson, A 
Systematic Analysis]. 
4 Self-defense, like lesser evils, involves a balancing of harms. In addition to the immedi-
ate objective harms created and averted, the harm to the social order inherent in unjustified 
aggression is significant for this defense. Such abstract interests explain society's willingness 
to justify one who kills an attacker, even though the immediate interests-a life for a 
life-seem evenly balanced. See generally Robinson, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 
214-15 (discussing self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property). 
6 An excuse defense exculpates an actor who has satisfied all the elements of an offense 
and who has caused net harm but who, due to a confirmable disability that creates an excus-
ing condition, cannot be considered responsible for his conduct. There are four types of 
excusing conditions, i.e., conditions that society recognizes as rendering an actor blameless: 
the conduct is not the product of his effort or determination; the actor does not perceive the 
physical nature or consequences of his conduct; the actor does not know his conduct is 
wrong; and the actor's ability to control his conduct is so impaired that he cannot be fairly 
held accountable for it. The duress defense, for example, is available to an actor who, due to 
a state of coercion brought about by a threat that a reasonable person could not resist, 
cannot sufficiently control his conduct so as to be held accountable for it. See generally 
Robinson, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 221-29 (discu?sing excuse defenses). 
6 Just as a state of coercion may bring about an excusing condition, supra note 5, intoxi-
cation may so affect an actor's perception, cognition, or control, as to render the actor 
blameless for his conduct. For example, a drunken person may kill a friend because of the 
alcohol-induced belief that God commanded him to do so or because the alcohol impaired 
his ability to control his actions. In both cases, the actor knew that he was killing someone, 
but society may deem his behavior to be insufficiently blameworthy to punish him. Insanity 
is another disability that warrants an excuse defense on the basis of similar excusing condi-
tions. Although the excusing condition is the central reason for the excuse defense, these 
defenses are often categorized according to the disability and not the resulting impairment. 
See generally Robinson, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 221-29 (discussing excuse 
defenses). 
7 A failure of proof "defense," unlike justifications and excuses, does not provide a ground 
of defense that is independent of the offense definition. A failure of proof defense is nothing 
more than the absence of one or more required elements of the offense. Although the state 
has the burden of proving the existence of each element of the offense, the defendant may 
wish to introduce particular evidence to rebut the prosecution's case, for example, evidence 
of intoxication to raise a doubt as to whether the defendant acted with the culpability re-
quired by the offense definition. 
8 For example, the Colorado lesser evils statute permits necessary and proportional re-
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imize the harm that would otherwise be caused by a forest fire that 
a defective muffler on his camper started, these jurisdictions would 
deny this actor a justification defense to a charge of arson• for 
burning the firebreak. 
Many self-defense statutes similarly appear to withhold a justifi-
cation defense on the basis of any causal contribution. One such 
statute denies the defense if the actor "brings on a difficulty. '"0 
Others deny the defense if the actor "provoked the other's use or 
attempted use of unlawful force" in the same encounter." This !at-
sponses to threats of injury only when the situation was "occasioned or developed through 
no conduct of the actor," Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 18-1-702(1) (1978); see also State v. Diana, 24 
Wash. App. 908, 913-14, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (1979) (defense unavailable where the actor 
brought about the compelling circumstances); cf. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 3096 (1983) {de-
fense available only if the actor did not provoke the danger). 
One might argue that a court, or at least some courts, would read into the Colorado stat-
ute some "fault" requirement and that, in the end, the statute adequately "does the job." 
This sort of argument, however, only shows the sad state of substantive criminal law theory 
and doctrine in the United States. First, that a court might read in a fault requirement only 
confirms the criticism of the statute: that it fails to include a fault requirement. Second, to 
assume that a court will, without fail, essentially rewrite a statute that is clear on its face is 
to assume too much. Third, to conclude that a statute has "done its job" when it has been 
saved by such judicial legislation is to expect very little from statutes. The most invidious 
effect of such a view of statutes is that if we expect inadequate, incomplete, and improper 
statutes, we will receive inadequate, incomplete, and improper statutes. That is exactly what 
we have in the United States, compliments of this sort of mindless acceptance of inadequate 
codifications. 
One need not be a criminal law purist to find offensive this indifference to the quality of 
criminal law codifications. Anglo~ American systems have committed themselves to the legal-
ity principle, which requires, for a plethora of compelling reasons, a clear, precise, and writ-
ten statement of the definition of offenses and all related rules of liability. Some of the 
rationales for the principle arise from concerns of fairness to the defendant, others from the 
concerns of improper delegation of legislative authority to the courts. See generally Robin-
son & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and 
Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681, 682-85, 691 n.42, 712-13 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Robinson 
& Grall, Element Analysis]. Yet American scholars, with a few commendable exceptions, 
blithely carry on with their acute preoccupation for intricate procedural rules but think 
nothing of statutes that must depend on a court to rewrite them to even begin approximat-
ing the most basic requirements of rationality and justice. 
9 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-105{1) (1978) ("Fourth degree arson"). 
In La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:21 (West 1974) (also denies the defense to the "aggressor"). 
11 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(b)(4) (Vernon 1974); accord Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
404(8)(3) (1978); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3214(3) (1981). In a limited way, Illinois, Iowa, and 
Kansas consider an actor's culpability as to the provocation. These statutes treat an actor 
who intentionally provokes another's force with the intent of creating an excuse to use force 
differently from one who merely provokes. The intentional provoker may not regain the 
right to use force; the mere provoker may. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 7-4(b)-(c) (Smith-
Hurd 1972); Iowa Code Ann. § 704.6(2). (3)(b) (West 1979); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3214(2)· 
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ter exclusion appears to disregard both the actor's lack of a culpa-
ble state of mind as to the provocation" and the unjustified re-
sponse to his provocation. 13 The exclusion appears to bar the 
defense even when the actor's provoking conduct does not consti-
tute an unjustified attack." For example, if the actor's choice of 
(3) (1981); see also infra note 13 (discussing provisions that allow a provoker to regain the 
right of self-defense). 
Some jurisdictions withhold the self-defense justification from the initial provoker only if 
the victim responds with nondeadly force. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.041(2)(a) (Harri-
son 1981) {initial provoker may use force if he reasonably believes he is in danger of death 
or great bodily harm and has exhausted all reasonable means of escape); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 
38, § 7-4(c)(l) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (same). 
12 Case law often uses broad language that purports to exclude any defendant who "pro-
vokes" the use of force, but the exclusion seems only to be applied against actors who are to 
some degree at fault as to whether their conduct would provoke force. See, e.g., Dabney v. 
State, 113 Ala. 38, 21 So. 211 (1897) (defendant's sexual intercourse with victim's wife found 
to be provocation sufficient to deny self-defense); Daniel v. State, 187 Ga. 411, 1 S.E.2d 6 
{1939) (defendant's armed attempt to recover money from victim was sufficient provocation 
to deny self-defense). In State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963), the defendant 
returned to a clubroom where he previously had an argument while shooting dice with the 
person he subsequently killed. The lower court viewed this as sufficient provocation to bar 
the defendant's plea of self-defense during the subsequent altercation. The Arizona Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction, holding that "[b]efore an act may cause forfeiture of 
the fundamental right of self-defense it must be willingly and knowingly calculated to lead 
to conflict." Id. at 122, 382 P.2d at 232. 
13 Most of the statutes cited supra note 11 restore the right to act in self-defense if the 
actor, after his initial provocation, effectively withdraws and communicates his withdrawal 
to his assailant and the assailant nevertheless continues the use of force. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 13-404(B)(3) (1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.041(2)(b) (Harrision 1981); Ill. Ann. 
Stat. ch. 38, § 7-4(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1972); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3214(3)(b) (1981). In 
short, the defense revives if the provoker is met with a response that is unjustified because 
it violates the necessity requirement. It is not clear why the defense should not similarly 
revive if the response is unjustified because it violates the proportionality requirement, i.e., 
because the responder uses more force than is reasonable in response to the threat or provo-
cation. Iowa revives the defense either if the provoker withdraws or if the response to his 
provocation is "grossly disproportionate" and the provoker reasonably believes that he is in 
imminent danger of death or serious physical injury. Iowa Code Ann. § 704.6(3) (West 
1979). 
14 It is hard to understand why the provoker should lose the right of self-defense when he 
is not culpable and when his conduct is too trivial to give rise to a right of self-defense for 
the person whom he provokes. For example, Texas explicitly provides that the use of force 
in response to verbal provocation is unjustified, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(b)(l) (Vernon 
1974), yet the actor who is a verbal provoker cannot defend himself against force used in 
response to his verbal provocation. ld. § 9.31(b)(4). Thus, the verbal provoker cannot de-
fend himself against an unjustified attack; usually only justified conduct is given such pro-
tected status. See Robinson, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 274-80. For a discussion 
of a basis for liability where a provoker culpably causes an attack by engaging in otherwise 
lawful conduct, see infra section II(E). 
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paint color for his house so upsets his neighbor as to provoke an 
attack, the actor would presumably be left without the right to de-
fend himself. Although one might hope that courts would interpret 
the statutory term "provoke" to require some culpability, this hope 
is of little comfort to the theorist or draftsman who seeks to imple-
ment rational criminal law through clear doctrine." 
Rather than using the term "provoke," some jurisdictions deny 
self-defense if the actor is the "initial aggressor."1 ' This rule allows 
·~ See supra discussion note 8. 
18 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-3-23(c)(2) (1982); Alaska Stat. § 11.81.330(a)(3) (1983); Am. 
Samoa Code§ 46.3305 (1981); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-506(2)(b) (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
1-704(3)(b) (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 53a-19(c)(2) (West 1972); Ga. Code Ann.§ 16-
3-21(b)(3) (1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-4I-3-2(d)(3) (Burns Supp. I984); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 503.060(3) (1915); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A. § 108(1)(B) (1983); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 563.031.!(1) (1978); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4(1)(b) (1974); N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 35.15(1)(b) (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-03(2)(b) (1976); Q,. Rev. Stat. 
§ 161.215(2) (1983); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2)(c) (1978); cf. Idaho Code § 18-4009(3) 
(1979) (self-defense for homocide denied if the actor was the "assailant"). 
As is the case with the "provoker" provisions, see sources cited supra note 13, the initial 
aggressor may typically regain the defense if he withdraws from the encounter and effec-
tively communicates his withdrawal. See Ala. Code § 13A-3-23(c)(2) (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-506(2)(b)" (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704(3)(b) (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 53a-19(c)(2) (West 1972); Ga Code Ann. § 16-3-21(b)(3) (1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-
3-2(d)(3) (Burns Supp. 1984); Ky. Rev. Stat.§ 503.060(3)(b) (1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
17-A, § 108(1)(B) (1983); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62N(I)(b) (1974); N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 35.15(l)(b) {McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code§ 12.1-05-03(2)(b) (1976); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 161.215(2) (1983); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2)(c) (1978). This solution for dealing with 
culpability in causing suffers, however, from the same defects as it does in the context of the 
provoker provisions: the defense does not revive if the response is merely disproportionate. 
See supra note 13. 
In addition, each of the jurisdictions above distinguishes the provoker who uses force with 
the intent of establishing a defense for his use of force from the actor who is merely an 
initial aggressor. The former may never regain the right of self-defense. See Ala. Code 
§ 13A-3-23(c)(l) (1982); A•k. Stat. Ann. § 41-506(2)(a) (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-
704(3)(a) (Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-19(c)(l) (West 1972); Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 16-3-21(b)(l) (1984); Ind. Code Ann.§ 35-41-3-2(d)(2) (Bums Supp. 1984); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 503.060(2) (1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § !08(1)(A) (1983); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 627:4(1)(a) (1974); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(1)(a) (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 12.1-05-03(2)(a) (1976); Q,. Rev. Stat. § 161.215(1) (1983); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
402(2)(a) (1978); see also statutes cited supra note 11 (intentional provoker always denied 
the defense; mere provoker regains upon withdrawal). Contra Alaska Stat.§§ 11.81.330(b), 
.335(a) (1983) (treating both the initial aggressor and the intentional provoker identically; 
both may regain the defense). 
The distinction between the actor who intentionally provokes and the actor who is merely 
the initial aggressor is clearly based on culpability. The distinction suggests that the less 
stringent "initial aggressor" standard, discussed in the first paragraph of this note, is not 
dependent upon fault. 
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the actor to retain the defense if his initial provocation falls short 
of physical force, as in the house-paint hypotheticaL It still fails, 
however, to consider the actor's culpability in committing his "ag-
gression" and to account for excessive and thus unjustified re-
sponses to the actor;s initial aggression. When an actor pushes an-
other person, either accidentally or deliberately so as to board a 
bus first, he would apparently be denied a right of self-defense 
under this statute when the other rider responds by shooting the 
actor. 17 
The same approach-barring the defense if the actor has con-
tributed in any way to causing the conditions of his defense-is 
frequently taken for excuse defenses as well. Most jurisdictions bar 
a general intoxication excuse if the intoxication was "voluntary."•• 
Several courts have defined voluntary intoxication so broadly as 
not to require any culpability as to causing the defense condi-
tions.'• Thus, the intoxicated actor who mistakenly believes his 
friend to be an attacker and shoots him would not receive a de-
fense, 20 even if he could show that he would not have made the 
17 Cf. State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 144, 244 S.E.2d 397, 409 (1978) (defining "aggressor" 
as one who "aggressively and willingly enters into a fight without legal excuse or provoca-
tion" (emphasis added)). 
18 See 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 176(b) (1984) (discussing voluntarily 
causing one's intoxication) [hereinafter cited as P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses]. Some 
courts, however, would permit a voluntary intoxication defense when the intoxication causes 
temporary insanity. See, e.g., Burns v. State, 591 S.W.2d 780, 783-84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1979). 
19 This is most frequently done through a narrow definition of what will constitute "invol-
untary" intoxication. See, e.g., Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625, 627 (D.C. 1965) 
(involuntary intoxication is without consent or through force or fraud, but cannot be caused 
by chronic alcoholism), modified, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (in cases of public drunken-
ness, chronic alcoholism constitutes involuntary intoxication; relying on alternate statutory, 
common law, and constitutional grounds); Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 754, 
759 n.4, 370 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 n.4 (1977) (intoxication is involuntary if consumption is 
forced or the substance is secretly administered), affd on other grounds, 376 Mass. 765, 771, 
383 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (1978) (declining to address the general issue of intoxication as an 
excuse). As a result, innocent mistakes apparently do not establish involuntary intoxication. 
2
(1 See Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 11 So. 250 (1892); Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 
(1858) (both holding that a claim of self-defense is not available if the actor's mistaken 
belief in the need for force is due to voluntary intoxication). The original statement in 
Golden referred only to drunkenness, with no qualification as to voluntariness, but the case 
has later come to be understood as referring to voluntary intoxication. See, e.g., Estes v. 
State, 55 Ga. 31, 32-33 (1875). The Estes court mentioned, although it did not quote, a 
provision of the Georgia criminal code that reads "[d]runkenness shall not be an excuse for 
any crime or misdemeanor, unless such drunkenness was occasioned by the fraud, artifice, 
or contrivance of other person or persons, for the purpose of having a crime perpetrated 
8 Virginw Law Review [Vol. 71:1 
mistake but for his intoxication and that he was not culpable as to 
becoming intoxicated. He would be convicted of intentional homi-
cide; he intended to kill. Similarly, some jurisdictions do not allow 
a defendant to use such voluntary intoxication as a failure of proof 
defense to show that he lacked the requisite culpable state of 
mind. 21 
All these causing-the-conditions provisions are clearly inappro-
priate. Where an actor causes the conditions of his defense but 
does so blamelessly, there is little justification for taking away his 
defense." He is no more blameworthy for causing the conditions of 
his defense than is the actor who has made no causal contribution. 
B. Withholding a Defense upon a Minimum Culpability as to 
Causing the Defense Conditions 
A somewhat more discriminating approach is to bar a defense 
whenever the actor is at fault, i.e., at least negligent, in bringing 
about the conditions of his defense. In self-defense," for example, 
." Act of Dec. 23, 1833, 1st div., § 9, 1851 Ga. Laws 778, 779 (Cobb). This position is 
even more restrictive than those cited supra note 19. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Handbook on Criminal Law § 45, at 347 (1972) (self-defense is not available to the volunta-
rily intoxicated actor because he must appraise the circumstances as the reasonable sober 
person would). 
21 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 754, 761, 370 N.E.2d 1021, 1025-
26 (1977) (evidence of voluntary intoxication, as defined supra note 19, is irrelevant except 
to disprove premeditation in homicide), affd on other grounds, 376 Mass. 765, 771, 383 
N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (1978). For other jurisdictions that deny evidence of intoxication in a 
failure of proof defense, see 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, supra note 18, § 65 n.13. 
~~ The rationales for strict liability do not apply here. Strict liability is frequently em-
ployed to avoid problems of proof and to deter harms caused in the course of certain highly-
dangerous activities. See generally Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 609, 
669-71 (1984) (discussing rationales for strict liability) [hereinafter cited as Robinson, Im-
puted Criminal Liability]. Clearly, the deterrence rationale does not apply to the wide vari-
ety of activities that may "provoke" an attack necessitating self-defense. Nor does that ra-
tionale apply to all conduct that may create the conditions of an excuse, for example, 
drinking what one believes is nothing more than water. The problems-of-proof argument is 
similarly unpersuasive here. See infra section III(C). 
~a For cases that deny a self-defense justification upon a showing of any fault, see United 
States v. Peterson, 483 F.Zd 1222, 1231 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973); Col-
lier v. State, 57 Ala. App. 375, 328 So. 2d 626 (Crim. App. 1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 397, 
328 So. 2d 629 (1976); People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59. 65-67, 153 P.2d 21. 25-26 (1944); Lind· 
ley v. State, 268 Ind. 83, 88, 373 N.E.2d 886, 889 (1978); State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St. 2d 
15, 20-21, 381 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1978); Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 975, 234 
S.E.2d 286, 290 (1977). Wisconsin limits the availability of self-defense if the actor engaged 
in unlawful conduct that was "likely to provoke others to attack him." Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 938.48(2)(a) (West 1982). 
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this approach avoids the improper presumption that every initial 
aggressor, even a justified one," is to blame for the resulting harm. 
A difficulty remains, however, in that although the actor's initial 
conduct may justify some responsive force, the force returned may 
be unnecessary or disproportionate. Consider the case of the unjus-
tified attacker who breaks off his attack but is nonetheless pursued 
unnecessarily and the case of the passenger whose push to get on 
the bus is met with an excessive response. In both cases the initial 
aggressor may have been initially at fault, but denying a right of 
self-defense seems inappropriately harsh." 
A greater difficulty, present in all provisions that bar a justifica-
tion defense based on the actor's fault in creating the justifying 
circumstances," is that it is unclear what it means to be "at fault" 
in causing the justifying circumstances. The process of creating a 
threat that requires some justified response involves a series of 
events. The actor must engage in some conduct, which then pro-
duces a condition that constitutes a threat, which then requires a 
justified response. With respect to which element(s) must the actor 
be at least negligent to be disqualified from a justification? In the 
firebreak case, for example, does one ask whether the actor was 
negligent as to having a defective muffler or as to whether the 
muffler would throw off a spark or as to whether it would throw 
off a spark and start a forest fire or as to whether it would throw 
off a spark and start a fire that would threaten a town or as to 
whether it would throw off a spark and start a fire that would 
threaten a town under conditions that would then justify his set-· 
ting fire to the field ?27 
2~ Often in the case of public authority justifications, the justified actor is the initial ag-
gressor. See Robinson, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 215-16 (1982). 
26 For statutes that allow the initial aggressor to regain the right of self-defense upon 
proper withdrawal, see supra notes 13, 16. 
26 This problem similarly arises with the Model Penal Code's choice of evils justification. 
See infra text accompanying notes 52-53. 
21 For statutes barring the lesser evils justification unless the situation giving rise to the 
defense arose through no fault, or without blame, of the actor, see Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 463 (1979) (through no fault); Guam Crim. & Corr. Code§ 7.80 (1977) (through no fault); 
IlL Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (without blame); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.026.1 
(1978) (through no fault); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05(2) {McKinney 1975) (through no fault). 
Recognizing the failings of such "fault in causing the circumstances" statutes, Professor 
Fletcher would adopt "a sensible compromise" under which the actor would receive a justifi-
cation defense (presumably even in the case of the "grand schemer," see infra section II(A)), 
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Even if the focus of the fault inquiry were clear, there is a fur-
ther, and greater, difficulty in an approach that excludes a defense 
because the actor was at fault in causing the defense: such an ap-
proach does not distinguish among different levels of fault in caus-
ing the conditions of the defense." The person who negligently 
starts the forest fire that justifies his later conduct receives the 
same treatment as the person who does so intentionally. For burn-
ing the firebreak, both would be convicted of the intentional of-
fense of arson. 
An actor who is culpable in causing the conditions of his excuse 
often receives analogous treatment. Several states, for example, 
deny an excuse defense to the actor who is unreasonably mistaken 
(negligent) in believing that he has a justification defense.•• Thus, 
the actor who irrationally and mistakenly believes that his friend is 
attacking him will lose his excuse of mistaken self-defense and will 
be convicted of murder (intentional kil!ing).30 
A murder conviction for such an actor seems improper, as he is 
certainly less blameworthy than the person who kills intentionally 
without even a claim of mistaken self-defense. Similarly, an actor 
who because of his intoxication is unable to "appreciate the wrong-
fulness" of his conduct or is unable to "conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law" and commits a murder while in this dis-
abled condition will lose his excuse if he was negligent as to be-
coming intoxicated. 31 Although he may have intended to become 
but would be obliged to pay civil compensation for any harm caused. G. Fletcher, Rethink-
ing Criminal Law 798 (1978). 
26 For decisions that seem to require only a minimal level of culpability in bringing about 
the provocation to disqualify the defendant from a self-defense justification, see, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, 460 Pa. 169, 176-77, 331 A.2d 473, 476 (1975) (to support a claim of 
self-defense, a defendant must be free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty; 
the court did not consider the effect of the Pennsylvania statute cited infra note 34); State 
v. Woodham, 162 S.C. 492, 502, 160 S.E. 885, 889 (1931) (approving the following instruction 
to the jury: "self-defense is not available to a person who uses language so opprobrious as is 
reasonably calculated to bring on a difficulty and which really does contribute to a physical 
encounter"). 
29 See Alaska Stat.§§ 11.81.330, .335 (1983) (self-defense); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-
404, to -405 (1978) (defense of others); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-4(a) (West 1982) (defense of 
others). Note that these provisions codify an excuse defense in the definition of a justifica-
tion. See Robinson, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 239-40. 
30 The actor, moreover, will not be eligible for a failure of proof defense, as he intends to 
cause his friend's death and thus satisfies the mental element for that offense. 
31 The excuse defense is completely unavailable if the actor "knowingly" introduced sub-
stances he either knew or "ought" to have known would tend to intoxicate him. Model Pe-
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intoxicated, he did not by his intoxication intend to kilL He was, at 
most, only negligent as to that result." Like the statutes on mis· 
taken justification and on intoxication, many state provisions bar a 
duress excuse if the defendant was to some degree culpable as to 
putting himself in the coercive situation." 
nal Code § 2.08(4), (5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (definition quoted infra text ac-
companying note 146). For further discussion of this point, see infra note 146 and 
accompanying text. Several states have adopted the above rule of§ 2.08. See, e.g., Ala. Code 
§ 13A-3-2 (1982); Ar;,, Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-105(33), -503 (Supp. 1984-1985); Ark. Stat. 
Ann. § 41·207 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat § 18·1-804 (1978); Del. Code Ann. t;t. 11, §§ 423, 
424(2) (1979); Guam Crim. & Carr. Code § 7.58(a)(2) (1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-
230(3), (4)(b) (1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 50!.010(4), .080(2) (1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ,;t. 
17-A, § 37(2), (3)(8) (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2C:2·8(d), (e)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985). 
Similarly, Georgia defines as "involuntary" any intoxication that is produced by the coer· 
cion or trick of another or by "excusable ignorance." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-4(b) (1984). 
"Excusable ignorance" seems to imply faultlessness, and negligence will most likely be ade-
quate to bar the actor's excuse. By contrast, South Dakota limits defense-denying "volun-
tary intoxication" to situations where the actor has knowingly introduced substances that 
tend to cause intoxication. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-1-2(49), -5-5 (1979 & Supp. 1984). 
"Knowingly" apparently refers to both the introduction and the intoxicating quality of the 
substance. 
32 One can argue that a murder conviction is appropriate in both of these excuse cases 
because the actor satisfies the elements of the offense at the time of the homicide and is "at 
fault" as to causing his defense, but the argument is unpersuasive. Although at the time of 
the killing, the actor in the second example satisfies the elements of murder, his intoxication 
by that time renders him irresponsible and therefore not blameworthy for the murder. 
When the actor was responsible, prior to his intoxication, he did not satisfy the elements of 
murder. 
~3 For statutes completely denying a duress defense when the actor was culpable as to 
placing himself in the coercive situation, see Alaska Stat. § 11.81.440(b) (1983) (duress de-
fense barred if the actor recklessly entered a situation where he probably would be subject 
to coercion); Am. Samoa Code Ann. § 46.3213(b){2) (1981) (same); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 13-412(B) (1978) (barred if intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly entered a situation of 
probable coercion); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-208(2) (1977) (barred if recklessly entered a situa-
tion of reasonably forseeable coercion); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-708 (1978) (barred if reck-
lessly entered a situation of reasonably foreseeable coercion); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-
14 (West 1972) (barred if intentionally or recklessly entered a situation of probable coer-
cion); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 431 (1979) (same); Guam Crim. & Corr. Code § 7.6l(b) 
(1977) (intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-3-8(b){1) (Burns 
1979) (intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly entered a situation of foreseeable coercion); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3209(2) (1981) (willfully or wantonly entered a situation of probable 
coercion); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 501.090(2) (1975) (intentionally or wantonly entered a situation 
of probable coercion); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 562.071.2 (1978) (recklessly entered a situation of 
probable coercion); N.Y. Penal Law§ 40.00(2) (McKinney 1975) (intentionally or recklessly 
entered a situation of probable coercion); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.270(2) (1983) (same); Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. § 8.05(d) (Vernon 1974) (intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly entered a 
situation of probable coercion); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(2) (1978) (same); Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 9A.16.060(3) (1977) (intentionally or recklessly entered a situation of probable 
coercion). 
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Some statutes resolve a few of the problems raised by the "at 
fault" approach. Their provisions establish that the relevant ques-
tion is whether the actor was at fault as to creating the defense 
conditions in order to commit an offense. For example, many juris-
dictions bar self-defense where the actor "provokes the use of force 
against himself with the intent to use such force as an excuse to 
inflict bodily harm upon the assailant .... ""Thus, in contrast to 
the result under the provision noted above, it is not enough for the 
state to show that the actor was culpable as to creating the condi-
tions of his defense. Rather, the actor must have been culpable as 
to committing the offense at the time he created the conditions of 
his defense." Further, by requiring a high level of culpability as to 
an ultimate offense, 36 these provisions avoid convicting an actor of 
an intentional offense when the actor was only reckless or negli-
gent as to its eventual commission. 
Even these statutes are not ideal. 37 First, under most of them, 
" Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-21(b)(l) (1984). For statutes in substantial accord, see Ala. Code 
§ 13A-3-23(c)(1) (1982); AJ.,ka Stat. § 11.81.330(al(2) (1983); A<k. Stat. Ann. § 41-
506(2)(a) (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-l-704(3)(a) (Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 53a-19(c)(l) (West 1972); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 7-4(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 35-41-3-2(d)(2) (Burns Supp. 1984); Iowa Code Ann. § 704.6(2) (West 1979); Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-3214(2) (1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.060(2) (1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
17-A, § 108(11(A), (21(CI(l) (1983); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4(1)(a), Ill(c) (1974); N.Y. 
Penal Law § 35.15(l)(a) (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-03{2)(a) (1976); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 161.215(1) (1983); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2)(a) (1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 939.48(2)(c) (West 1982); cf. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-105(2) (1983) {self-defense not 
available to one who purposely or knowingly provokes the use of force against himself). 
A few provisions bar only the use of deadly force to one who provokes the use of force 
against himself for the purpose of causing serious harm or death. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 464(e){l) (1979); Guam Crim. & Corr. Code§ 7.86(b){l) (1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat.§ 703-
304(5)(a) (1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(a) (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2Co3-4(b)(2)(a) 
(West 1982); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 505{b)(2)(i) {Purdon 1983); Model Penal Code 
§ 3.04(2)(b)(i) {Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
3
& The Montana statute seems to require culpability only as to provoking an attack and 
not as to an ultimate offense. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-105(2) (1983). 
38 The Montana statute requires less culpability, either purpose or knowledge as to pro-
voking the attack against oneself. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-105(2) (1983). 
37 The "intentional provocation" provisions are usually coupled with "initial aggressor" or 
"initial provoker" provisions that seem to deny the defense with no inquiry into fault. See 
the statutes cited supra notes 13, 16, 34. Only in Alaska may one who provokes the attack 
with the intent of causing injury regain the defense of self-defense by withdrawing. See 
Alaska Stat. §§ 11.81.330, .335 (1983). In the other jurisdictions, discussed in the cited 
notes, the initial aggressor and the mere provoker may regain the defense, but the inten-
tional provoker cannot. That an "aggressor" did not intend to provoke an attack that would 
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the actor will lose a self-defense claim to a charge of murder even 
when he intends only to provoke the conditions for a defense to a 
charge of assault or of causing bodily harm." Thus, he will lose any 
justification defense and be liable for murder if his intentional ver-
bal harassment is met with deadly force rather than the fist fight 
that he anticipates.'• Second, the provisions may be too liberal in 
some cases. If an actor is reckless as to provoking an attack that 
will require him to respond with deadly force, he will retain his 
right of self-defense. If an actor who intentionally creates a justifi-
cation to kill can be convicted of intentional homicide, however, 
why then should the actor who is reckless as to creating such a 
situation not be convicted of reckless homicide?" 
The "at fault" provisions, even at best, are defective because 
they are oversimplified. Although apparently based on principles 
of fault and blameworthiness, these provisions actually avoid the 
relevant inquiry-the actor's culpability as to committing the of-
fense-and instead rely on rough-and-ready rules that only rough-
ly approximate the results dictated by the culpability principle. 
justify a response may thus matter only in that he, but not the intentional provoker, may 
regain his defense if he withdraws. 
38 A few of the statutes require culpability as to a more serious offense. See Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 503.060(2) (1975) (defense barred if actor had intention of causing death or serious physi-
cal injury); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-03, -07 (1976) (barred if actor had intention of caus-
ing bodily injury or death); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.48(2)(c) (West 1982) (death or great bod-
ily harm). The Kentucky and Wisconsin provisions, however, have another undesirable 
effect. They permit a defense for the person who intends to provoke an attack that will 
allow him to inflict an injury that does not rise to the level of "serious" or "great." Thus, he 
can escape liability for the exact offense that he intended to commit. 
J& Even if the actor withdraws when he meets with deadly force, he will not be able to 
regain the right CJf self-defense. See supra note 16. 
•o One jurisdiction attempts to deal with this issue. In Wisconsin, "[a] person who en-
gages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him and thereby does 
provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack 
... " Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.48(2)(a) (West 1982). This provision is flawed, however, in a 
way similar to the Model Penal Code intoxication provision discussed supra text accompa-
nying note 31. It permits conviction for intentional homicide if the actor merely engaged in 
conduct "likely to provoke" an attack. As the statute does not seem to require the defen-
dant's awareness of the likelihood of provocation, it se"ems to bar a defense, even to inten-
tional homicide, if the actor was merely negligent as to the provocative nature of his 
conduct. 
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C. Imposing Reduced Liability upon a Minimum Culpability 
as to Causing the Defense Conditions 
A common alternative to barring a defense altogether if the actor 
is at fault in causing the conditions of his defense is to bar a com-
plete defense but to permit a mitigation of liability. This approach 
is reflected in one form of the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense." 
This doctrine applies where an actor provokes a battle but then 
justifiably kills to defend himself. In this situation, he will be de-
nied total or "perfect" exoneration but will qualify for a mitigation 
in liability from murder to voluntary manslaughter." This ap-
proach is based on the view that an actor who is partially "at 
fault" in causing the conditions of his defense is more culpable 
than an actor who is entirely free from fault, but is less culpable 
than an actor who does not satisfy the defense conditions. 
One problem with this version of "imperfect self-defense" is that 
it is unclear why mitigation is appropriate only in homicide of-
fenses and only for the self-defense justification." An even more 
important problem with this approach is that it fails to account for 
different degrees of culpability in causing the conditions of a de-
fense. The initial aggressor who is only negligent as to causing the 
justifying circumstances receives the same treatment as the initial 
aggressor who is reckless." The actor who is negligent as to becom-
ing intoxicated is treated the same as the ac.tor who becomes so 
intentionally." 
An analogous mitigation is used where voluntary intoxication is 
offered as a failure of proof defense. Most jurisdictions allow this 
~~ See, e.g., State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 144, 244 S.E.2d 397, 409 (1978). 
<~ One jurisdiction does permit mitigation in all offenses where the actor culpably causes 
the conditions of a general intoxication excuse. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04(b) (Vernon 
1974) (implying that evidence of temporary insanity caused by voluntary intoxication may 
be introduced in mitigation of penalty but not as a defense). This treatment permits convic-
tion for an offense requiring purpose, knowledge, or recklessness, allowing only mitigation in 
punishment, even where the actor is only negligent as to causing the conditions of his de-
fense, becoming intoxicated. In Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the 
defendant was aware that a "suspected" drug was placed in his drink, but the court did not 
evaluate whether he was aware of the type of drug or the effect that the drug might have. 
The court nevertheless, consistent with the Texas position on intoxication, denied a defense 
to murder. 
43 See State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 144 n.2, 244 S.E.2d 397, 409, n.2 {1978) (proposition 
implied). 
H See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04(b) (Vernon 1974). 
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defense for offenses requiring purpose or knowledge but deny it for 
other, lesser-included offenses." Thus, a voluntarily intoxicated 
killer is not punished as a murderer, but neither is he given a com-
plete defense, even if he has no culpability as to causing death. 
Recklessness will be imputed to him and will provide the basis for 
a manslaughter (reckless homicide) conviction. The most common 
rationale given for this rule is that the actor's culpability in becom-
ing intoxicated is an adequate basis on which to impute reckless-
ness as to committing the offense." 
Denying a failure of proof defense for voluntary intoxication that 
negates the recklessness required for manslaughter is troubling, 
•o The Model Penal Code, for example, holds an actor liable by treating him as if he were 
aware of a risk, even though he is unaware of it, if his unawareness is due to self-induced 
intoxication. Model Penal Code § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("When reckless-
ness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is 
unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness 
is immaterial."). For a comprehensive list of jurisdictions adopting this position, see 1 P. 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, supra note 18, § 65 n.6. 
Oregon law provides the following: 
(1)The use of drugs or controlled substances, dependence on drugs or controlled sub-
stances or voluntary intoxication shall not, as such, constitute a defense to a criminal 
charge, but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence that the defendant used drugs 
or controlled substances, or was dependent on drugs or controlled substances, or was 
intoxicated may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative an 
element of the crime charged. 
(2)When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the defendant, due to 
the use of drugs or controlled substances, dependence on drugs or controlled sub-
stances or voluntary intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which the defendant would 
have been aware had the defendant been not intoxicated, not using drugs or con-
trolled substances, or not dependent on drugs or controlled substances, such un-
awareness is immaterial. 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.125 (1983); accord Ala. Code§ 13A-3-2(a), (b) (1982); Am. Samoa Code 
§ 46.3214 (1981); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 53a-7 (West 1972); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 
§ 37 (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-8(a), (b) (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. Penal Law 
§§ 15.05(3), 15.25 (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-04-02 (Supp. 1983). 
Other jurisdictions limit the defense more severely. A few bar evidence of voluntary intox-
ication regardless of the offense. See 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, supra note 18, 
§ 65 n.l3. Others permit voluntary intoxication evidence only where it is relevant to negate 
a "specific intent." See id. § 65 n.11. Others permit the evidence where it is relevant to 
negate purpose, motive, or intention. See id. § 65 n.lO. 
•e See People v. Walker, 58 A.D.2d 737, 396 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1977) (even if defendant's 
voluntary intoxication was a factor in his shooting of the victim after an argument, such 
intoxication constituted reckless conduct that amounted to manslaughter); see also Model 
Penal Code § 2.08 comment 3, at 8-9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) ("we believe it fair to postu-
late a general equivalence between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor 
and the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk"). 
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however, for a number of reasons. The problems are analogous to 
those that arise from rejecting a general intoxication excuse when 
the intoxication is voluntary. First, the imputation of culpabil-
ity-recklessness under codes following the Model Penal Code, and 
greater culpability under many other codes-is generally triggered 
by a definition of "voluntariness" in becoming intoxicated that re-
quires only negligence. Intoxication is "self-induced" under the 
Model Penal Code, for example, if the actor "knows or ought to 
know" the tendency of the substance to intoxicate." Assume that 
X kills a pedestrian by driving at a speed that he should know 
risks such a death, but that he does not know of the risk because of 
his voluntary intoxication. The Model Penal Code would convict 
him of reckless homicide, despite his unawareness of the risk. His 
conviction would stand even if he had only been negligent in be-
coming intoxicated. Thus, he could be found guilty of reckless 
homicide if a neighbor gave him what he honestly but erroneously 
believed to be a regular cigarette if he should have known (perhaps 
because it was hand-rolled) that it might contain an intoxicating 
substance."8 
Second, the imputation of recklessness is objectionable because 
even if the actor is reckless, or even purposeful, as to getting intox-
icated, it does not follow that he is reckless as to causing the death 
of the pedestrian. The notion that a person risks all manner of 
resulting harm when he voluntarily becomes intoxicated is com-
mon,<• but is obviously incorrect." 
47 Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (enlphasis added). 
18 The Model Penal Code definition of "self-induced intoxication" has an additional flaw: 
it does not take account of situations in which an actor may know of the intoxicating effect 
caused by his drinking, but is not fully responsible for that drinking, as in the case of the 
chronic alcoholic. See infra section II(F)(2). 
49 Indeed, the Model Penal Code drafters supported their presumption of recklessness by 
stating that the "awareness of the potential consequences of excessive drinking on the ca-
pacity . . to gauge the risks incident to . . conduct" is sufficiently widespread to justify 
an equation of the actor's culpability in becoming intoxicated with the actor's culpability in 
committing an offense requiring recklessness. Model Penal Code § 2.08 comment 3, at 9 
{Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); see Lloyd v. State, 42 Md. App. 167, 170, 399 A.2d 932, 934-35 
(1979) ("extreme" intoxication by itself may indicate a wanton and reckless disregard for 
human life and therefore may support a finding of gross negligence sufficient for a man-
slaughter conviction). 
~0 Hawaii rejects the Model Penal Code provision for just this reason: "It equates the 
defendant's becoming drunk with the reckless disregard by him of risks created by his sub-
sequent conduct and thereby forecloses the issue." Hawaii Rev. Stat.§ 702-230 commentary 
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Finally, the imputation of a culpable state of mind when none 
truly exists seems particularly strange for the Model Penal Code 
drafters. These drafters actively opposed placing the burden of 
persuasion on the defendant for most defenses. Yet as to intoxica-
tion, the drafters permit what is in essence an irrebuttable pre-
sumption as to the existence of an element of the offense." 
D. Imposing a Degree of Liability Corresponding to the Level 
of Culpability as to Causing the Defense Conditions 
In a few provisions, the Model Penal Code demonstrates greater 
sensitivity to differences in culpability as to causing the conditions 
of one's defense. Its choice-of-evils justification, for example, pro-
vides that "when the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing 
about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils ... the 
[choice of evils] justification ... is unavailable in a prosecution for 
any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may 
be, suffices to establish culpability."" The Commentary explains 
that the drafters chose this approach because it "precludes convic-
(1976); see also Model Penal Code§ 2.08 comment 3, at 7 (Tent. Draft No.9, 1959) (report-
ing that Judge Hand and other members of the Advisory Committee preferred a rule that 
would permit voluntary intoxication to negate recklessness). 
~~ Indeed, it can be argued that such a presumption of recklessness would be unconstitu-
tional under Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197 (1977). Under Mullaney and Patterson, the burden of disproving an essential element 
of the offense cannot be allocated to the defendant. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 215-16; 
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 701-02. Moreover, mandatory presumptions are allowed only where 
they are rebuttable, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979), and where they are 
triggered by evidence that "is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt." County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 166 (1979). 
It is possible, however, that the rules governing voluntary intoxication need not be analo-
gized to irrebutable evidentiary presumptions. They may instead rely upon notions of 
equivalent culpability rather than a theory of evidentiary presumptions. In other words, it 
may be not that recklessness is presumed, but that the actor who is voluntarily intoxicated 
is considered as culpable as one who is reckless. See generally Robinson, Imputed Criminal 
Liability, supra note 22, at 660-63 (discussing rationales for punishing the voluntarily intoxi-
cated). For a discussion of limitations on theoretical solutions to culpability in causing dic-
tated by Supreme Court decisions, see infra section III(D). 
u Model Penal Code § 3.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); accord Am. Samoa Code 
Ann. § 46.3304(b) (1981); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-504(3) (1977) (using Model Penal Code for-
mulation); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 703-302(2) (1976) (using Model Penal Code forumulation); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.030(2) (1975) (requiring wantonness or recklessness, whereas § 3.02 
requires negligence or recklessness); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 103(2) (1983) (using 
Model Penal Code formulation, but substitutes criminal negligence where the Code uses 
negligence); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1407(2) (1979) (using Model Penal Code formulation); 
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tion of a purposeful offense when the actor's culpability inheres in 
recklessness or negligence, while sanctioning conviction for a crime 
for which that kind of culpability is otherwise sufficient to con-
vict."" This approach raises several questions, however. 
First, we have already seen the ambiguity in a requirement that 
an actor be culpable as to "causing" the conditions of his defense.•• 
The Model Penal Code Commentary's reference to instances when 
"the actor's culpability inheres in recklessness or negligence" .. is 
no improvement. To which events in the chain of events creating 
the conditions of the defense must that culpability apply: reckless-
ness as to having a defective muffler, or as to having a muffler that 
will start a forest fire that will then threaten a town and thereby 
create the need for justified conduct? 
Second, the provision inexplicably fails to treat the case where 
an actor purposely or knowingly creates the triggering conditions. 
The anomaly is compounded because the failure to include such a 
case in a provision limiting the defense suggests that the pur-
poseful or knowing actor retains the defense. Thus, one who inten-
tionally sets the forest fire would receive the defense, whereas the 
defendant who only negligently creates the conditions that trigger 
the defense would not. •• 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:3(II) (1974) (same); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 503(b) (Purdon 
1983) (same). 
u Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment 1, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). 
6 ~ See supra text accompanying notes 26-27. 
6~ This anomaly may be an inadvertent result of a paramount concern with avoiding ex-
cessive liability for an actor whose culpability is relatively minor. See supra notes 26-27 and 
accompanying text. One might argue that a defendant who is purposeful or knowing "in 
bringing about the situation" may be held liable for a reckless or negligent offense. A gen-
eral provision of the Code, § 2.02(5), provides that when negligence suffices to establish an 
element of the offense, it is also satisfied if the actor is purposeful, knowing, or reckless with 
respect to that element. Model Penal Code § 2.02(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The 
use of two culpability terms, "reckless" and "negligent," in§ 3.02_(2) suggests, however, that 
the drafters did not intend § 2.02(5) to apply; if that had been their intent, use of the term 
"negligence" would have sufficed. Simple rules of statutory construction lead to the conclu-
sion that by identifying two culpable states, the drafters intended to exclude the others. 
Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b)(i) lends further credence to this interpretation. In 
§ 3.04(2)(b)(i), the drafters specifically address the case of the defendant who purposely 
creates the justifying circumstance for self-defense and do not address the actor who is reck-
less or negligent as to provoking the use of force against himself. It seems, then, that the 
drafters intended to treat only the reckless or negligent actor in lesser evils, and only the 
purposeful one in self -defense. 
o@ Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment 1, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). 
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Finally, the provision assumes a structure of offense culpability 
that is inconsistent with the offense-defining provisions of the 
Code. If an actor is reckless or negligent in causing the justifying 
circumstances, the Code bars the defense for "any offense for 
which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to 
establish culpability."" Nowhere is such a "reckless offense" or 
"negligent offense" concept defined or explained. It appears to 
presume a culpability system in which every offense has a single 
culpability requirement. This presumption is most unusual, com-
ing as it does from draftsmen who were pioneers in providing the 
theoretical insight that offenses do not have one required level of 
culpability, but rather may have a different culpability require-
ment as to each objective element of an offense." To speak of the 
actor's culpability as somehow "inher[ing] in recklessness or negli-
gence," as the Code Commentary tries to explain it," is to reject 
the systematic "element analysis" approach carefully laid down by 
the Code in § 2.02 and to regress to the vague and mystical "of-
fense analysis" view of culpability requirements." 
The Code sometimes uses a similar approach when an actor 
causes the conditions of an excuse. He is liable for an offense hav-
ing the level of culpability that he possessed with respect to caus-
ing his disability or excusing conditions. Thus, under the Code, an 
actor who is only negligent in being placed under duress could be 
convicted only of a negligent offense. The Code, however, then re-
verts to a pure "at fault" approach when the actor is at least reck-
less as to being placed under duress. The reckless actor will lose 
the defense completely." The Code is therefore only partially sue-
67 Id. § 3.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
68 See generally Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis, supra note 8, at 694·99 (explaining 
the Model Penal Code's method of requiring a specific culpability for each offense element). 
69 See Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment 1, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). 
6° Cf. Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis, supra note 8, at 715-19 (distinguishing ele-
ment analysis from offense analysis and discussing the use of both forms of analysis in the 
Model Penal Code). 
61 Model Penal Code § 2.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); accord Ala. Code § 13A-3-
30(b) (1982) (defense unavailable if actor intentionally or recklessly places himself in situa-
tion; if negligently, defense unavailable for negligent offense); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702-
231(2) (1976) (Model Penal Code formulation); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 103A(3)(B) 
(1983) (Model Penal Code formulation); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2C:2-9(b) (West 1982) (Model 
Penal Code formulation, except that "criminal negligence" is substituted for the word "neg-
ligence," and a special provision is made for murder); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 309(b) 
(Purdon 1983) (Model Penal Code formulation); cf. N.D. Cent. Code§ 12.01-05-10(2) (1976) 
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cessful in accounting for different levels of culpability in causing 
the conditions of the excuse. Where A intentionally wounds B 
while in a state of coercion that would normally provide a duress 
excuse, A would nonetheless be convicted of intentionally wound-
ing B, so long as A was even reckless as to placing himself in a 
situation where coercion was likely. 
Even if the actor's liability were limited to the degree commen-
surate with his level of culpability as to causing the conditions of 
his excuse, however, the statute would suffer the same shortcom-
ings displayed in the context of lesser evils. One who is reckless as 
to placing himself in a situation where he will be subjected to coer-
cion is not necessarily reckless as to being coerced into injuring 
another." Similarly, although an actor may intentionally place 
himself in a coercive situation to help a relative held hostage, he 
does not necessarily intend to be coerced to commit a robbery. To 
bar a duress defense in such a case simply does not generate liabil-
ity proportionate to the actor's culpability. 
E. Inconsistent Approaches Within the Same Jurisdiction 
A survey of five defenses-self-defense, lesser evils, the intoxica-
tion excuse, duress, and intoxication as a failure of proof de-
fense-reveals that the Model Penal Code treats the issue of caus-
ing the conditions of one's defense differently in each of the five 
instances. The Model Penal Code denies a defense on a showing of 
a minimum level of culpability for three defenseS--the intoxication 
excuse, the duress defense where the actor is reckless in placing 
himself in the coercive situation, and the self-defense justifica-
tion. 63 For the defense of intoxication negating an element, the 
(pure "at fault" approach applies only when actor willfully enters a duress situation by vol-
untarily entering into a "criminal enterprise"), The duress statutes cited supra note 33 cod-
ify the Model Penal Code's complete bar to the defense where recklessness is at issue, but 
do not provide a special negligence provision. 
a• The Missouri duress statute arguably corrects this problem by barring the defense only 
where the actor "recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will 
be subjected to the force or threatened force." Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 562.071.2(2) (1978). One can 
construe this provision to bar a defense only to the actor who risked being coerced to com-
mit the offense that he committed. The Missouri statute is listed supra note 33 because it 
makes no adjustment in levels of liability for varying levels of culpability in causing one's 
defense. 
e3 Model Penal Code§ 2.08(4), (5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (intoxication excuse 
denied if actor is negligent as to intoxication); id. § 2.09(2) (duress excuse denied if actor is 
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Code imposes a reduced degree of liability on a showing of a mini-
mum level of culpability as to causing the defense conditions." In 
two other defenses-lesser evils•• and duress where the actor is 
negligent in placing himself in the coercive situation••-the Code 
imposes a degree of liability that corresponds to the actor's level of 
culpability in causing the conditions of his defense. 67 
Further variations exist. In four of the defenses, the relevant is-
sue is the actor's culpability as to causing the conditions of his de-
fense.•• In only one case does the actor's liability depend on his 
culpability as to the ultimate offense.•• 
The defenses, moreover, differ as to the degree of culpability 
that will disable an actor from successfully invoking the defense. In 
four of these defenses, if the actor is negligent he either loses the 
defense entirely or at least loses the opportunity for a complete 
defense.70 In the fifth defense the critical culpability level-that 
level at which he will lose the defense-is much higher; purpose is 
required.71 
Thus, within this one code actors who cause the conditions of a 
defense are treated in very different ways depending on the de-
fense, even where similar defenses are at issue. The Code treats the 
two justification defenses differently in three respects 72 and treats 
reckless as to being subjected to coercion); id. § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (self-defense justification de-
nied if actor intended to provoke an attack that would justify his use of deadly force in 
response). This approach is discussed supra section I(B). 
6~ Model Penal Code § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (if actor is negligent as to 
intoxication, his intoxication can negate negligence, purpose, or knowledge, but recklessness 
is always imputed). This approach is discussed supra section I(C). 
66 Model Penal Code § 3.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) . 
.. !d. § 2.09(2). 
61 This approach is discussed supra section I(D). 
68 See Model Penal Code § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (intoxication negating 
an element); id. § 2.08(5)(b) (intoxication as a general excuse); id. § 2.09(2) (duress); id. 
§ 3.02(2) (lesser evils). 
89 Id. § 3.04{2)(b)(i) (use of deadly force in self-defense). 
10 Id. § 2.08(4), (5)(b) (intoxication as a general excuse; loses defense entirely); id. 
§ 2.08(1), (2), (5)(b) (intoxication negating an element; actor does not lose defense entirely 
but instead obtains a reduction in liability to an offense that requires recklessness); id. 
§ 2.09(2) (duress; if actor is negligent, he can be convicted only of an offense of negligence 
or strict liability; recklessness bars the defense entirely); id. § :l02(2) (lesser evils; if actor is 
negligent he can be convicted only of an offense of negligence or lesser culpability; if reck-
Jess, then can be convicted only of an offense requiring recklessness or lesser culpability). 
71 ld. § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (self-defense). 
12 Compare id. § 3.02(2) (lesser evils) with id. § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (self-defense). In lesser evils, 
negligence is sufficient to deny the defense in some cases; in self-defense, only purpose will 
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the excuse defenses in three different ways.'·' A particular excuse 
defense, duress, is itself treated in two ways." Intoxication negat-
ing an offense element is given a unique treatment." 
Several jurisdictions have adopted these inconsistencies.'• Other 
jurisdictions add their own inconsistencies by further refining the 
self-defense situation. An initial "aggressor" will lose the defense 
even if he was not culpable as to causing either the defense or the 
ultimate harm, but one who simply "provokes" an attack must do 
so with an intent to gain a defense before he will lose the defense. 77 
At least one jurisdiction adds another distinction by ignoring an 
actor's culpability in causing his defense where his intoxication ne-
gates an offense element.'• Other jurisdictions eliminate a Model 
Penal Code inconsistency by treating all cases of duress identi-
deny the defense. In lesser evils, a culpable actor loses the defense for offenses requiring 
equivalent or lesser culpability; in self-defense, the culpable actor loses the defense regard-
less of the offense charged. Finally, in lesser evils, the actor may be culpable only as to 
causing the conditions of the defense to lose the defense, but in self-defense, the actor must 
be culpable as to the ultimate offense. 
18 Compare id. § 2.08(4), (5)(b) (intoxication excuse) with id. § 2.09(2) (duress). In intox-
ication, negligence as to causing the defense conditions bars the excuse regardless of the 
offense, whereas in duress, only recklessness as to causing the defense conditions bars the 
excuse. In duress, negligence as to the defense conditions bars the defense only for an of-
fense requiring negligence, whereas in the intoxication excuse, negligence results in a bar to 
the defense regardless of the offense. Finally, whereas instances of culpably causing an in-
toxication defense are treated identically-the defense is barred-instances of culpably 
causing a duress defense are treated differently. In some cases, the defense is barred en-
tirely; in others the defense is barred only for particular offenses. 
,. Id. § 2.09(2) (recklessness bars defense; negligence permits conviction only for an of-
fense of negligence or strict liability). 
1
& ld. § 2.08(1), (2), (5)(b) (voluntarily intoxicated actor cannot use intoxication to rebut 
recklessness as to the elements of an offense). 
16 For inconsistent treatment of justifications, compare Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 703-302(2) 
(1976) (lesser evils) with id. § 703.304(5)(a) (self-defense). 
For inconsistent treatment of intoxication defenses and of duress, compare Hawaii Rev. 
Stat. § 702-230(3), (4)(b) (1976) {intoxication excuse), with id. § 702-231(2) (duress). Also, 
compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-8(a), (b), (d), (e)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (intoxication 
excuse and failure of proof defense), with id. § 2C:2-9(b) (West 1982) (duress). 
For intoxication negating an element, see Hawaii Rev. Stat.§ 702-230(1) (1976) (intoxica-
tion negating an element is always a defense, thus adding another deviation). 
17 Compare statutes cited supra notes 11, 16 with statutes cited supra notes 34-40. A fur-
ther type of distinction in this area is between initial provokers, or aggressors, who retain 
the defense if they withdraw, and intentional provokers, who usually lose the defense com-
pletely. See supra notes 13, 16, 37. 
78 See Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 702·230(1) (intoxication negating an element always a 
defense). 
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cally-'• These jurisdictions, however, introduce a new inconsis-
tency: negligence \Vill cause the actor to lose an intoxication ex-
cuse, but recklessness is required for him to lose a duress excuse.'" 
F. Failure to Consider an Actor's Culpability in Causing the 
Conditions of his Defense 
Perhaps worse than the inconsistent treatment of actors who 
cause the conditions of different defenses is the basic inconsis-
tency, found in every jurisdiction, that arises when the law simply 
fails to account for some actors who cause the conditions of their 
defenses. Many states fail to consider an actor's causing his own 
defense in many instances where it may be relevant, such as caus-
ing a duress excuse, a lesser evils defense, a justification defense of 
special responsibility or of defense of property," or an insanity de-
fense." A notable example of this attitude is found in Fain v. 
Commonwealth,"' where the defendant offered an involuntary act 
defense by claiming that he had a sleep disorder that caused him 
to act violently on being awakened: 
If the prisoner is and has been afflicted in the manner claimed, 
and knew, as he no doubt did, his propensity to do acts of violence 
when aroused from sleep, he was guilty of a grave breach of social 
duty in going to sleep in the public room of a hotel with a deadly 
weapon on his person, and merits, for that reckless disregard of the 
safety of others, some degree of punishment, but we know of no 
law under which he can be punished. Our law only punishes· for 
overt acts done by responsible moral agents. If the prisoner was 
unconscious when he killed the deceased, he cannot be punished 
for that act, and as the mere fact that he had the weapon on his 
person and went to sleep with it there did no injury to any one, he 
79 See duress statutes cited supra note 33. 
8° For example, compare Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-208(2) (1977) (duress) with id. § 41-207(1), 
(2)(b) (intoxication excuse). 
81 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (protection of prop-
erty); id. § 3.08 (special responsibility). Compare id. § 3.04(b)(l) (purpose to invoke the 
defense bars the use of deadly force in self defense) with id. § 3.06(d) (a defense of property 
provision that is a parallel to the deadly force provision in self-defense, but lacks any con-
sideration of the actor's culpability as to causing the defense conditions). 
82 See State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 215-16, 287 A.2d 715, 721-22 (1972) (where insanity is at 
issue, court will not consider the etiology of the disease). 
s3 78 Ky. 183 (1879). 
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cannot be punished for that. 84 
Yet every jurisdiction considers an actor's causing his own de-
fense for some defenses, and every jurisdiction thus acknowledges 
that such causing-one's-defense can be relevant to an actor's liabil-
ity. If it is relevant when an actor causes one defense, why is it not 
equally relevant when he causes another? 
One might argue that the issue of causing-one's-defense does not 
arise in most defenses. This argument is undercut, however, by the 
existence of statutory provisions that consider it to some degree for 
a wide variety of defenses. At least two jurisdictions consider it in 
the context of insanity;" another considers it for hypnosis.•• Many 
jurisdictions consider the issue for duress;"' several consider it for 
lesser evils.•• Many consider it for self-defense,•• many for defense 
of others," a few for defense of property,"' and at least one consid-
s• Id. at 192-93. 
u See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 3154 (1983) ("Transitory mental unsoundness caused 
purposely does not excuse criminal liability."); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 10.77.010(7) (Supp. 
1984-1985) {"No condition of mind proximately induced by the voluntary act of a person 
charged with a crime shall constitute 'insanity.'"). 
56 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626:2(1I)(c) (1974) (person who creates a risk, but is una-
ware of it solely by reason of having voluntarily engaged in hypnosis, acts recklessly with 
respect to a material element of the offense). 
a7 See, e.g., Alaska Stat.§ 11.81.440(b) (1983) (duress defense unavailable when a person 
recklessly places himself in a situation wh~re it is probable that he will be subject to duress); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-412(B) (1978) (duress defense unavailable if the person intention-
ally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in probable duress situation); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:2-9(b) (West 1982) (duress defense unavailable for any offense if actor recklessly 
places himself in probable duress situation, also is unavailable if the actor was criminally 
negligent in placing himself in such situation whenever criminal negligence establishes 
culpability). 
88 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 18-1-702(1) (1978) (choice of evils situation must have been 
occasioned or developed through no conduct of the actor); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 463 
(1979) (choice of evils situation must have developed through no fault of the defendant); 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 703-302(2) (1976) (choice of evils defense is unavailable in a prosecution 
for an offense in which recklessness or negligence suffices to establish culpability if the actor 
was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring the choice). 
89 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.060(2), (3) (1975) (self-defense is never available where 
defendant, with intention of causing death or serious injury, provokes the use of physical 
force and is unavailable where the actor is the initial aggressor unless the actor later with-
draws); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-03(2) (1976) {self-defense unavailable where person in-
tentionally provokes unlawful action in order to cause bodily injury or death); Tex. Penal 
Code Ann.§ 9.3l(b)(4) (Vernon 1974) (self-defense unavailable if actor provokes the unlaw-
ful force). 
90 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 464(e)(l), 465(a)(1) (1979) (actor must not have 
provoked the use of force so as to invoke defense of others with the purpose of causing 
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ers it for the judicial authority defense." 
That even one jurisdiction considers an actor'::.; causing the con-
ditions of his defense suggests that at least one jurisdiction be-
lieves that the issue is relevant for that defense. Further, there are 
appellate cases in which an actor has caused the conditions of his 
defense for the defenses of involuntary act,93 duress,•• lesser evils,•• 
self-defense,•• insanity,•' defense of others,•• defense of property,"' 
death or serious physical injury); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-04 (1976) {defense of others 
available if actor has not, by provocation or otherwise, forfeited the right of self-defense); 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 505(b)(2)(i), 506(a)(l) (Purdon 1973) (for defense of others actor 
must not provoke force with intent of causing serious injury or death). 
111 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-3-2(d)(2), (3) (Burns Supp. 1984) (defense of property 
unavailable to one who provokes unlawful action of another with intent to cause injury or to 
one who is the initial aggressor); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3213, -3214(2), (3) (1981) (defense of 
property unavailable to person who initially provokes the use of force); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 
33, § 3095 (1983) (defense of property is available provided there is a lack of sufficient 
provocation by the actor). 
92 See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 102(2)(A) (1983) Uustification of judicial authority 
unavailable if the officer knowingly procured a defective order). 
93 See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 1960) (on retrial, jury could 
consider whether defendant, an epileptic, knew at the time he drove that he might black 
out); Smith v. Commonwealth, 268 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1954) (defendant, who struck and killed 
a pedestrian while driving an automobile, knew he was subject to frequent blackouts while 
driving; the defense of no voluntary act was unavailable; citing, but not distinguishing, Fain 
v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879)); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (App. 
Div. 1951) (defendant had a history of blackouts from M(mi~re's Syndrome; defense of no 
voluntary act was unavailable where the defendant claimed he caused injury during a black-
out while driving); see also supra text accompanying notes 83-84. 
u See, e.g., People v. Bailey, 41 Colo. App. 385, 590 P.2d 508 (1978) (defendants inten-
tionally or recklessly placed themselves in situation where it was foreseeable that they might 
be subject to force; thus duress was unavailable), affd, _Colo._, 630 P.2d 1062 (1981); 
Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N.E. 781 (1907) (compulsion must have arisen without the 
negligence or fault of the person who insists on it as a defense); State v. Clay, 220 Iowa 1191, 
1203, 264 N.W. 77, 83 (1935) (same) (citing Ross). 
96 See, e.g., People v. Perez, 97 Ill. App. 3d 278, 280-81, 422 N.E.2d 945, 947-48 (1981) 
(failure to instruct on lesser-evils defense proper where there was no evidence that defen-
dant was without fault in bringing about the circumstances); State v. Diana, 24 Wash. App. 
908, 913-14, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (1979) (defense unavailable where compelling circum-
stances were brought about by the defendant). 
911 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1231 (D.C. Cir.) ("The right of 
homicidal self-defense is granted only to those free from fault in the difficulty; it is denied 
to slayers who incite the fatal attack [or] encourage the fatal quarrel. . ."), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 1007 (1973); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 460 Pa. 169, 176-77, 331 A.2d 473, 476 
(1975) (defendant must be free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty to claim 
self-defense). 
91 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 680 F.2d 659, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1982) (insanity 
brought about by voluntary intoxication is not a defense); United States v. Burnim, 576 
F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1978) (insanity defense unavailable to defendant whose insanity was the 
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and judicial authority.'" Obviously, then, the issue of causing the 
conditions of one's defense can arise in all of these defenses. Thus, 
the failure of most jurisdictions to have comprehensive provisions 
to deal with this issue probably reflects inadvertence rather than a 
defensible conclusion that the issue will not arise except in the few 
situations specifically addressed by statute. 
G. Conclusion 
The problem of how to treat an actor who causes the conditions 
of his own defense has not yet received thoughtful or comprehen-
sive treatment by judges or lawmakers. A defensible general princi-
ple is needed to govern all instances of an actor's culpability in 
bringing about the conditions of his defense. A single general prin-
ciple would assure a consistent approach to different defenses.'" It 
would also assure that some mechanism existed to take account of 
such causing-one's-defense whenever it arose, for all defenses. 
Part II of this article proposes such a general principle. It rejects 
all the existing approaches, even the sophisticated approach de-
scribed in subsection D, because they ignore the most critical fac-
tor for determining the actor's appropriate liability: the actor's cul-
pability as to committing the offense at the time he causes the 
conditions of his defense. As Part II demonstrates, a focus on an 
actor's conduct and culpability at the time of causing the condi-
product of voluntary intoxication); cf. State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 215·16, 287 A.2d 715, 721· 
22 (1972) (although culpability in causing insanity was at issue, court refused to consider the 
etiology of the disease). 
98 See Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 43-44, 349 A.2d 378, 384 (1975) (actor who is at 
fault in bringing on the difficulty may be entitled to an "imperfect" defense of others); 
Commonwealth v. McGuire, 487 Pa. 208, 217 n.4, 409 A.2d 313,318 n.4 (1979) {for a defense 
of others, neither the person defended nor the defender may be at fault in provoking the 
difficulty) (citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 467 Pa. 183, 355 A.2d 572 (1976)). 
99 See, e.g., Pierce v. Floyd, 38 Ala. App. 439, 86 So. 2d 658 (1956) (defense of property in 
a civil action is unavailable if defendant was at fault in bringing on the affray). 
100 See, e.g., David v. Larochelle, 296 Mass. 302, 5 N.E.2d 571 (1936) (public authority 
justification available in a civil action where defendant was unintentionally at fault in caus-
ing arrest warrant to issue). 
101 The absence of such a general principle may reflect an insensitivity to the inconsis-
tency problems discussed supra in subsections (E) and (F), or it may reflect the lack of 
consensus as to which of the approaches discussed supra in subsections (A) through (D) 
would make the best model for a general principle. Finally, although it seems highly un-
likely, it may reflect unarticulated distinctions intentionally drawn to generate appropriate 
differences. 
1985] Causing One's Own Defense 27 
tions of his defense, rather than on his conduct and culpability at 
the time of the offense, avoids nearly all of the problems nuted in 
this Part and generates results that more closely approximate our 
collective notions of justice. 
II. A PROPOSAL: MAINTAINING THE DEFENSE FOR THE OFFENSE 
CoNDUCT BUT IMPOSING LIABILITY FOR CoNDUCT IN CAUSING THE 
DEFENSE CONDITIONS 
As Part I illustrates, the current treatment of an actor who is 
culpable in causing the conditions of his defense is inadequate in 
many troubling respects. Moreover, current law imposes liability 
on the actor through the theoretically unsound method of denying 
him a defense. This Part suggests an analysis that would continue 
to allow the actor a defense for the immediate conduct constituting 
the offense, but would separately impose liability on the basis of 
the actor's earlier conduct in culpably causing the conditions of his 
defense. 
This alternative, "conduct-in-causing" analysis avoids the 
problems arising from current law treatment and has several ad-
vantages. It avoids the anomaly of denying a justification or excuse 
to an actor who satisfies the conditions of those defenses. It avoids 
the improper assumption that an actor who intends to cause (or 
risks causing) the conditions under which an offense is committed 
necessarily intends to commit (or risks committing) the offense. It 
also properly distinguishes among levels of culpability at the time 
of causing one's defense in determining the level of liability to be 
imposed. 
A. Maintaining the Defense Although the Actor Has Caused 
Its Conditions 
Where conduct is justified because it avoids a net harm for soci-
ety, it provides little basis on which to fasten blame and it is 
against society's interest to deter it. Where a forest fire has been 
set, for whatever reason, society wants any and all persons to set a 
firebreak and save a threatened town!02 To withdraw a defense for 
such conduct is to punish and to discourage it. 
102 For an analogous argument in the context of the unknowingly justified actor, see 
Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 
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Assume that an actor sets a fire that threatens a nearby town to 
create the conditions that will justify his using his enemy's farm as 
a firebreak. Denying a justification defense might dissuade him 
from undertaking such a scheme, but if it fails to dissuade him, the 
unavailability of the defense may reduce his incentive to set the 
firebreak and save the town. Once the justifying conditions exist, 
regardless of the cause, society benefits if the actor undertakes the 
justified conduct. Moreover, if the defense is denied, the owner of 
the field, who values his crop more than he does the lives of the 
townspeople, may lawfully interfere with the actor's attempt to set 
fire to the field. 
Denying the defense to the actor who has created the justifying 
circumstances also creates an anomalous situation in which the ac-
tor and another person may work side-by-side engaging in the 
same conduct-here, setting fire to the same field-yet one will be 
justified and the other will not. It is the nature of justified conduct 
that it either is or is not justified-depending on whether it causes 
a net societal benefit-regardless of the particular state of mind, 
past or present, of the actor. 103 
These problems may be avoided, however, and such a grand 
schemer may be properly punished, if his liability is based on his 
initial conduct in causing the justifying circumstances and on his 
culpable state of mind, at that time, as to causing the justified 
harm.'" In the culpably-caused-need-for-a-firebreak case, the ac-
tor might be liable for setting the forest fire in the first place and 
for the damage it caused. His subsequent conduct in saving the 
town by setting the firebreak would remain justified, and thus 
would be encouraged and protected. 10' Indeed, the actor retains a 
special incentive to set the firebreak, for if the town burns down 
and kills or injures someone, he may be be liable for this additional 
harm. 
23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 284-92 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Robinson, A Theory of 
Justification]. 
'Q3 For a discussion of the attributes of justified conduct, see Robinson, A Systematic 
Analysis, supra note 3, at 274, 279-80. 
104 The precise means of defining the actor's liability will be set forth in subsection C. 
106 Similarly, where a speeder must choose between hitting two pedestrians or damaging a 
grocery store, he may be justified in veering off toward the store. He should not escape 
liability entirely, however, because his speeding is properly viewed as an intentional creation 
of a risk of injury to persons or property. He may properly be held liable for reckless de-
struction of property. The destruction itself is justified; it is his earlier creation of the risk 
on which liability may be imposed. 
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As with justifications, there is a fundamental flaw in an ap-
proach that denies an excuse because the actor culpably causes the 
conditions of his excuse. Just as causing one's defense does not al-
ter the justified nature of otherwise justified conduct, it does not 
erase the excusing conditions that exculpates the actor for the of-
fense conduct. If an actor is not responsible when a recognized dis-
ability causes an excusing condition for his actions, it follows that 
he is equally not responsible at the moment of the same offense 
conduct under similar conditions, even though he has contributed 
to their creation. To punish an actor for conduct performed when 
he is not responsible is to punish him for conduct that society has 
determined to be beyond his control and thus blameless.106 Punish-
ing blameless conduct undercuts the condemnation and credibility 
of the criminal justice system. In short, the reasons for initially 
providing an excuse remain the reasons for retaining it whenever 
the excuse conditions are met.'" It remains appropriate, however, 
to punish the actor based on his initial conduct in causing his ex-
cuse conditions. 
B. Existing Offenses that Punish Conduct Causing the 
Conditions of a Defense 
Sometimes, an actor's conduct in bringing about the conditions 
of his defense will be criminal. For example where an actor is crim-
inally negligent in causing a forest fire, he may be convicted of 
criminally negligent burning in some states (of the forest burned 
by his initial conduct).'" Where he intentionally starts the fire, he 
may be convicted of arson. 109 Some jurisdictions have specialized 
offenses to punish one who provokes an assault or procures a false 
warrant."' Similarly, voluntary intoxication is often an offense, at 
'
08 For a more detailed discussion, see Robinson, A Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 
221-29; see also supra note 5 (describing excuse defenses in general). 
107 The same conclusion is appropriate no matter what one's theory is for permitting an 
excuse. See generally A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 11, 16 (1967) (arguing that each of 
the theories underlying criminal law~deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation~justifies 
punishment of actors other than those who are capable of choosing how they will behave). 
108 E.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.46.400 (1983). 
to& More precisely, he may be convicted of arson if he was additionally reckless as to 
placing another person, such as a firefighter or camper, in danger of serious injury. Id. 
110 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-3 (Burns 1979) (provocation criminalized); Evans 
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least where such intoxication is public.'" Several jurisdictions have 
also defined offenses punishing those who engage in certain activi-
ties or who cause certain harms while intoxicated.'" 
There is not always an offense, however, that punishes the con-
duct that causes the defense conditions. Statutes rarely prohibit 
hypnotization, for example. Similarly, Supreme Court cases clearly 
establish that one may not be punished for a mere "status offense" 
such as being addicted to intoxicants.'" These status offense con-
cerns, however, do not apply to conduct that causes the conditions 
of a defense. In any case, reliance only on the criminalization of 
conduct that causes a defense is inadequate in most cases. Even if 
this liability is available, it fails to account for different levels of 
culpability as to committing a subsequent offense and for varia-
tions in the seriousness of the subsequent offense. 
C. A General Principle of Liability for an Actor Who Culpably 
Causes the Conditions of His Defense 
Where an actor brings about the conditions of his defense but at 
the time has no culpability, not even negligence, as to causing or 
risking the commission of the subsequent offense, it is appropriate 
to limit his liability to that imposed by existing statutes. If his con-
duct constitutes negligent property destruction or being drunk in 
v. State,_ Ind. App. _, 434 N.E.2d 940 (1982) (upholding§ 35-42-2-3 against vagueness 
attack); accord C.Z. Code tit. 6, § 271 (1962) (malicious procurement of warrants criminal-
ized); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 221 (1964) (same). 
111 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1315 (1979) (public intoxication unlawful); Model 
Penal Code § 250.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (same). 
m Several provisions appear to ensure punishment of one who causes an excusing condi-
tion by punishing those who engage in certain activities while intoxicated. See, e.g., Alaska 
Stat. § 11.61.210(a)(l) (1983) (possessing, on one's person, a firearm while intoxicated); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-106(1)(d) (Supp. 1984) (same); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:98 (West 
Supp. 1984) (operating vehicle while intoxicated); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 750.167a (West 
1968) (hunting while intoxicated); Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 577.010.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (operating 
vehicle while intoxicated). 
Some jurisdictions also have special statutes governing harms caused while intoxicated. 
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-205(1)(b)(l) (Supp. 1984) {causing serious bodily injury to 
another by driving under the influence of an intoxicant; strict liability); Md. Ann. Code art. 
27, § 388A (1982 & Supp. 1984) (homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated); Mo. Rev. 
Stat.§ 577.005 {Cum. Supp. 1983) (negligently causing death while driving in an intoxicated 
state); Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 940.09 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-1985) (homicide committed due to 
intoxicated use of a vehicle or firearm). 
us Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 
(1968) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) (explaining Robinson). 
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public, then such offenses are properly the extent of his liability. If 
his conduct does not constitute an offense, he faces no iiabiiity. 
Where the actor is not only culpable as to causing the defense 
conditions, but also has a culpable state of mind as to causing 
himself to engage in the conduct constituting the offense, the 
state should be punish him for causing the ultimate justified or 
excused conduct.'" His punishment, however, is properly based on 
his initial conduct of causing the defense conditions with his ac-
companying scheming intention, not on the justified or excused 
conduct that he subsequently performs. 
Under this analysis, one need simply consider whether, at the 
time that the actor engages in his initial conduct in causing the 
defense conditions (for example, starting the forest fire), he has a 
culpable state of mind as to causing the conduct constituting the 
offense (i.e., burning the firebreak). For example, if when the de-
fendant sets the forest fire, his ultimate objective is to create the 
conditions that will permit him (or anyone else) to burn the fire-
break, he is properly held liable for intentionally causing the burn-
ing of the firebreak. His liability is based on his conduct of setting 
the forest fire with his accompanying intention to cause the burn-
ing of the firebreak, not on his justified burning of the firebreak. 
He is then liable for the result that he has intentionally caused, yet 
all persons are still justified in burning the firebreak. no 
1
" This occurs in a "grand schemer" case, for example, where the actor intends to create 
the defense conditions to then commit the defense. It is no doubt the concern for the "grand 
schemer" that creates a hesitation to provide an excuse when an actor has culpably caused 
the disability and excusing conditions. As one court complained: "All that the crafty crimi-
nal would require for a well-planned murder ... would be a revolver in one hand to commit 
the deed, and a quart of intoxicating liquor in the other with which to build his excusable 
defense." State v. Arsenault, 152 Me. 121, 130-31, 124 A.2d 741, 746 (1956). Perhaps the 
"grand schemer" best known in the popular culture is the vigilante character of the 1974 
movie "Death Wish," who deliberately takes late-night walks and subway rides to place 
himself in threatening situations where he could kill the muggers who tried to attack him. 
"
6 There is some legislation designed to punish the grand schemer in the manner sug-
gested here. At least one jurisdiction punishes as a murderer one who perjures himself with 
intent to bring about circumstances justifying the execution of an innocent person. Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102(1)(c) (1978); cf. statutes cited supra note 110 (punish only for the 
conduct causing the justifying circumstances). 
One might argue that the conduct of a grand schemer in causing the justified burning of 
the field should give rise to liability for only attempted property destruction. Like the un-
knowingly justified actor, this actor intended to cause a legally-recognized net harm and 
acted upon that intention, but caused only a justified harm. See generally Robinson, A The-
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This approach has the additional advantage uf holding an actor 
liable for burning the firebreak when his grand scheme causes 
others to burn the firebreak, rather than limiting such liability, as 
current law tends to do, to the situation where he personally burns 
it.'" In addition, under this analysis the actor and all others are 
encouraged to perform the justified conduct. 117 Finally, this analy-
sis accounts for different degrees of culpability as to the ultimate 
ory of Justification, supra note 102, at 288-91 {discussing attempt liability for the unknow-
ingly justified actor). 
There are valid objections, however, to imposing only attempt liability on one who culpa-
bly creates justifying circumstances. First, it would give to an actor bent on crime a device 
to limit his liability to an attempt to commit the offense, simply by creating circumstances 
that would justify his conduct constituting the offense. (He would also be liable for any 
offense committed while creating the justifying circumstances, for example, setting a forest 
fire, but as noted in the text of this subsection, the conduct in causing is not always an 
offense.) 
Second, the situation is not really analogous to that of the unknowingly justified actor. 
There, no net harm has been caused, except for the harm or evil of the bad intention that 
the unknowingly justified actor acted upon. Here, however, in considering whether there is a 
net harm, one must look at the time before the actor engaged in the conduct creating the 
justifying circumstances. From this perspective, the actor's conduct in creating the ju~tifying 
circumstances did create a net harm-he engaged in conduct that ultimately caused the 
burning of the firebreak at a time when there was no justification for such conduct. He has 
thus caused two harms: (1) the immediate harm-the forest fire, and (2) the harm of the 
justified conduct necessary to combat the forest fire-the firebreak. The burning of the 
firebreak is justified because under the circumstances as they then exist, the harm of the 
firebreak avoids a greater harm. The firebreak, however, is a harm necessitated by the ac-
tor's initial conduct. Nor would attempt liability be sufficient where the actor culpably 
causes an excusing condition; excused conduct does cause a harm or evil. See Robinson, A 
Systematic Analysis, supra note 3, at 229 (arguing that acts of the excused are socially 
harmful, but such actors do not merit punishment). 
1u For example, the Model Penal Code provides a justification defense to one who be-
lieves the person whom he assists is entitled to protect himself. Model Penal Code 
§ 3.05(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). There is no readily apparent means of holding a 
provoker liable for the conduct of one who comes to the provoker's assistance when the 
person provoked attacks the provoker. One might, however, argue that id. § 2.06(2)(a) ("Li-
ability for Conduct of Another; Complicity") imposes liability on the theory that the pro-
voker caused an innocent person to engage in the conduct and is therefore accountable for 
the conduct. 
li? The actor generally has an incentive to engage in the justified conduct himself and 
assure that the greater harm is avoided. If he fails to do so, he will increase his own liability. 
Where the firebreak is not burned, for example, he may be held liable for the death and 
destruction of the entire town. Liability will be based either on his initial conduct in setting 
the forest fire and creating a risk of such death and destruction or, under an omission the-
ory, on his failure to act to avoid the harm when he could have done so at little risk to 
himself and where he had a duty to do so because he created the danger. The Model Penal 
Code contains a provision to cover this situation. ld. § 220.1(3)(b) (actor who starts a fire 
commits a misdemeanor if he knows that the fire is endangering life or substantial amounts 
of property and fails to take reasonable steps to put it out). 
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offense. If at the time of starting the forest fire the actor is only 
aware of a risk that hi~ l:unducl will cause hin1 (or others) to burn 
the firebreak, he is properly held liable only for recklessly causing 
the destruction of the firebreak. 
The same analysis is appropriate when an actor causes the con-
ditions of an excuse. He may properly be held liable for the ulti-
mate offense on the basis of his causing the excused conduct and 
his accompanying culpable state of mind with respect to his com-
mission of the ultimate offense. Thus, where the actor arranges for 
a hypnotist to give him an hypnotic suggestion to kill his wife, the 
actor may be liable for intentionally killing his wife. He is liable 
not on the basis of his conduct of killing her while in an hypnotic 
state, as that conduct is excused, but instead on the basis of his 
earlier, unexcused conduct of seeking to be hypnotized with the 
intention of thereby causing the subsequent death of his wife. 
An actor may be culpable as to causing the ultimate offense 
when he causes the disability-for example, by going to the hypno-
tist-or when he fails to terminate or at least to make allowance 
for a preexisting disability. Assume that an epileptic fails to take 
his anti-seizure medicine, and during a seizure in an elevator he 
strikes and injures two people. His liability is properly determined 
by asking whether, at the time he failed to take his anti-seizure 
medicine, he was aware that this failure might subsequently cause 
physical injury to others. If so, he should be liable for reckless as-
sault. If he intended to injure these people he can be convicted of 
intentional assault. Under this analysis, the defendant in Fain u. 
Commonwealth, 118 who had a disorder that made him violent when 
aroused from sleep, could have been punished for his "breach of 
social duty in going to sleep in the public room of a hotel with a 
deadly weapon on his person.""' Because he "no doubt [knew] his 
propensity to do acts of violence when aroused from sleep, "120 he 
could properly have been held liable for reckless homicide based 
on his earlier conduct of going to sleep in a public place with a gun 
in his lap. 
As in the justification situation, this approach is also useful be-
cause it establishes that an actor who causes excusing conditions is 
118 78 Ky. 183 (1879); see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
"
9 Fain, 78 Ky. at 192. 
1~0 ld. 
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liable for the resulting harm no matter who actually engages in the 
excused conduct. For example, the result in the hypnosis hypothet-
ical would be the same whether the defendant employs the hypno-
tist to compel the defendant himself or to compel another to kill 
the defendant's wife. There is clear precedent for holding people 
liable for causing irresponsible agents to engage in otherwise crimi-
nal conduct.' 21 There is no reason why the analysis should change 
if instead of causing another person to perform the conduct, the 
actor causes himself to perform it. 
Furthermore, this analysis properly accounts for different de-
grees of culpability as to the ultimate criminal conduct. If at the 
time of causing the conditions of the excuse the actor is reckless as 
to ultimately causing a death, he may properly be held liable for 
reckless homicide. If the actor should know, but does not, that .a 
notoriously insane hypnotist may give him a hypnotic suggestion 
to kill, the actor is negligent as to the death when he undergoes 
hypnosis and kills pursuant to such a suggestion. 122 
This analysis is similarly useful when the excuse at issue is mis-
take as to a justification. Suppose a police officer with poor eye-
sight decides not to wear his glasses on the job. As a consequence, 
he mistakenly believes that an arrestee is threatening him with a 
gun, and because of his misperception he unjustifiably kills the ar-
restee. The proper question in assessing liability is whether, at the 
time he decided not to wear his glasses, the officer was aware of 
the risk of such an error and of the consequences of the error. If he 
was reckless as to making such an exculpatory mistake and thereby 
ut See, e.g., Moore v. State, 267 Ind. 270, 277, 369 N.E.2d 628, 632 (1977) ("At common 
law, one who caused an act to be committed by an innocent agent was guilty of the act 
himself."); Attorney-Gen. Reference (No. 1 of 1975) 61 Crim. App. 118 (1975) (one who 
spiked another's drink and thus caused the other's drunk driving would be guilty of "pro-
curing" drunk driving); 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982) (actor who willfully causes an act to be done 
that would be an offense if directly committed by the actor is guilty of an offense); Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-1-116 (1977) (one who causes another's involuntary intoxication is liable for the 
offense} (repealed P.L. 1983, Ch. 171); Model Penal Code § 2.06(2)(a} (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962) (a person is accountable for the conduct of an innocent or irresponsible actor if 
he culpably causes that conduct}; cf. Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 18-5-116 (Supp. 1984) (fourth degree 
felony to intoxicate another by trick). 
122 A third useful characteristic of this analysis is that where the ultimate offense is never 
committed, the defendant may nonetheless be liable for an attempt to commit the offense. 
For example, where the hypnotist refuses to carry out the actor's request and reports the 
request to the police, the actor may be held liable for attempted murder. This result is 
consistent with normal attempt theory. 
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causing this result when he chose not to wear his glasses, he may 
properly be convicted of reckless homicide. 123 
A final example of the propriety of the foregoing analysis is a 
failure of proof defense where an actor's voluntary intoxication ne-
gates an offense element. The actor's liability for the offense may 
be based on his conduct at the time he becomes voluntarily intoxi-
cated and his accompanying state of mind as to the elements of the 
subsequent offense. If he intoxicates himself with the intention of 
committing a robbery while intoxicated,"' he would be liable for 
the crime even though at the time of the robbery he might not 
have had the required state of mind. 
This analysis has advantages analogous to those illustrated in 
the context of general defenses. For example, it properly accounts 
for different levels of culpability as to causing the subsequent of-
fense. Assume an actor knows that he always beats his wife uncon-
trollably after he returns from drinking with his buddies and that 
he knows that the severity of the beating is directly proportional to 
the extent of his drinking. He decides to kill his wife, goes to the 
bar intending to drink heavily to cause the desired beating, and 
returns home and uncontrollably beats his wife to death. The evi-
dence suggests that at the time of the beating, because of his gross 
intoxication, he was unaware of a risk that his conduct would kill 
his wife. He may not even have been aware of his conduct. The 
Model Penal Code would permit his intoxication to negate purpose 
or knowledge as to the death of his wife; it would impute reckless-
ness and thereby convict him of reckless homicide (manslaugh-
123 This analysis is necessary because the actor would probably gain a mistake as to a 
justification defense otherwise. The Model Penal Code deprives an actor of a defense only if 
he is reckless or negligent at the time of the mistake as to a justification. Model Penal Code 
§ 3.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Both recklessness and negligence are assessed from 
the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation, which would include bad eyesight. See id. 
§ 2.02(2)(c), (d). 
One might argue, however, that the police officer loses the defense because, when he 
failed to wear his glasses, he was reckless or negligent in "failing to acquire any knowledge 
or belief which is material to the justifiability of his use of force." ld. § 3.09(2). Yet that 
provision was probably intended to apply only when the actor is faced with a possibly justif-
icatory situation, but has sufficient time to make appropriate inquiries and fails to do so. 
The Commentary to § 3.09(2) is unhelpful in clarifying this issue. See Model Penal Code 
§ 3.09 comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). Moreover, there seem to be no reported cases 
addressing this issue in the states that have enacted this provision of the Code. 
m This situation existed in DeBerry v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Ky.), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 881 (1956). 
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ter).'" It seems clear, however, that a conviction for an intentional 
killing (murder) would be appropriate here. The proposed causing-
one's-defense analysis would hold the actor liable for murder, 
based on his conduct in causing his intoxication and his then-ex-
isting intention to kill his wife. 
Not only does the proposed analysis avoid treating such a grand 
schemer too leniently, but it also protects a less-culpable actor 
from being treated too harshly. The Model Penal Code would im-
pute recklessness to the drinker who at the time of his imbibing is 
unaware of any risk that he may kill or even beat his wife and thus 
would convict him of reckless homicide. The proposed analysis 
would avoid such an unwarranted result. The jury would examine 
his state of mind as to killing his wife at the time he began to 
drink and would probably conclude that at that time he was at 
most negligent as to causing his wife's death. He would thus be 
liable for, at most, negligent homicide. Indeed, a jury might con-
clude that a reasonable person under the same circumstances 
might have been unaware of a risk of causing his wife's death; thus, 
the actor might escape liability even for negligent homicide."• 
D. Precedent for a Principle of Liability for Causing the 
Conditions of One's Defense 
This Part's focus on the actor's earlier conduct and his accompa-
nying culpability as to the ultimate offense, rather than on the 
conduct and culpability most immediately associated with the of-
fense, is analogous to liability for causing a crime by an innocent. 
The analysis simply generalizes the latter principle and treats the 
justified, excused, or unaware actor as the "innocent actor" who 
was caused to engage in the criminal conduct by the actor's prior, 
culpable actions. Thus, the statutes and cases imposing liability for 
such causing-crime-by-an-innocent127 provide a certain measure of 
support for the principle proposed here of liability for causing the 
conditions of one's defense. 
1 ~e See Model Penal Code § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
n& He might be liable, however, if his earlier conduct is itself an offense, such as public 
intoxication, or if he satisfies at the time he began to drink, the requirements of any other 
offense, such as negligently endangering others. 
1 ~7 For citations to such cases and statutes, see Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 
supra note 22, at 631-32 nn.?l-76. 
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The present analysis is also entirely consistent with the normal 
operation of criminal liability rules of cau.satiun. Assume that the 
actor's car accelerator has recently been sticking momentarily. Be-
ing a seasoned auto mechanic, she realizes that the accelerator 
could become stuck in the full- throttle position. In such an emer-
gency, she would need at least thirty seconds to slow her car and 
would therefore be unable to respond if another car or a pedestrian 
suddenly crossed her path. She reasons that because she will be 
driving on a straight and open highway she is unlikely to face any 
emergency that will require her to react quickly. In the middle of 
her excursion, the accelerator becomes stuck, and while she is try-
ing to release it, she sees a line of school children crossing the high-
way during a nature outing. Because of her rapidly increasing 
speed, she cannot avoid the children and kills four of them. As-
sume that at the time of the killing she is truly helpless to avoid 
the children. Although she is not affirmatively "taking a risk" at 
the time of the offense (in the sense that she is consciously choos-
ing to drive that fast-she has no choice at that point), we can 
nevertheless hold her liable for reckless, or at least negligent, 
homicide. This liability would be based on her earlier conduct of 
setting in motion the chain of events-culpably causing the condi-
tions-that led to the four deaths. 
From a narrow time perspective the driver is blameless for the 
deaths, because the car was out of her control at the time of the 
offense. Her preceding act of driving with the defective accelerator 
was reckless, however, as to causing the deaths of pedestrians. By 
broadening the time perspective to include the earlier conduct and 
its accompanying culpability as to the ultimate harm, one may 
then properly impose liability for the deaths despite the driver's 
inability to avoid the harm at the time it actually occurred. 128 This 
use of traditional causation rules is analogous to the proposed 
1 ~8 Indeed, one might argue that the Model Penal Code provisions on causation and crim-
inal homicide are already adequate to allow such a finding of liability. A person who reck-
lessly "causes the death of another human being" is guilty of manslaughter, Model Penal 
Code § 210.1, .3(1)(a) (1980), and the requirements as to causation might be open-ended 
enough to allow such a finding of causation in some cases. See id. § 2.03(1), (3) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). It is likely, however, that without a special rule expressly permitting 
liability under such a causing-one's-defense analysis, the causation requirement might fre-
quently be held to be unsatisfied, i.e., the ultimate offense might be "too remote" from the 
actor's conduct in causing the conditions of his defense for the actor to be held accountable 
for the offense. 
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causing-the-conditions analysis. 
There is case law precedent for the causing-one's-defense analy-
sis proposed here.'" In the civil case of David v. Larochelle,130 for 
example, the defendant sheriff failed to complete the summons 
form that required plaintiff to appear in court; he indicated 
neither the plaintiffs name nor the time for his appearance. When 
the plaintiff failed to appear, the defendant, unaware of his own 
error, arrested him for his nonappearance. The plaintiff subse-
quently sued for assault and false arrest. The court held that the 
defendant sheriffs error had no effect on the legality of the arrest 
and that the arrest was therefore justified. 
The holding in Larochelle is consistent with the rule proposed 
here: conduct that is otherwise justified should remain justified 
even though the actor may have been culpable in bringing about 
the justifying circumstances. The actor, however, should not neces-
sarily escape liability for his conduct in creating the justifying cir-
cumstances. Larochelle is also consistent on this point. The sheriff 
was liable for the damages resulting from his negligent failure to 
complete the summons properly.'" 
uv See, e.g., State v. Butner, 66 Nev. 127, 135, 206 P.2d 253, 257 (1949) (person who 
drinks to nerve himself before committing a crime cannot maintain that he was too drunk at 
the time of the offense to entertain the requisite intent), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); 
see generally R Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1008-09 (3d ed. 1982) (where premedita-
tion and deliberation occur before the defendant causes his excusing intoxication, the defen-
dant is properly held liable for the offense perpetrated); Model Penal Code§ 2.08 comment 
3, at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (noting that those who objected to the Model Penal Code 
formulation of the intoxication negating an element defense, which is discussed supra notes 
45-51 and accompanying text, argued that the voluntarily intoxicated actor's liability could 
be based on the actor's awareness of the harm risked at the time he became intoxicated). 
In Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 CaL 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970), the 
court would not hold the defendant directly liable under the felony-murder rule for the 
justifiable killing of one of his co-felons by the owner of a store that the defendant and his 
co-felons were robbing. The court was willing, however, to permit an imputation of liability 
under a theory of vicarious liability. It focused on the co-felon's earlier conduct of initiating 
the gun battle that caused the justifying circumstances. Under the analysis proposed in the 
text, however, where the actor intentionally causes the justifying circumstances but is only 
reckless as to whether a justified killing will result, as the Taylor court conceded to be the 
case there, id. at 582-83, 477 P.2d at 133, 91 CaL Rptr. at 277, the defendant may properly 
be held liable only for reckless homicide. The contrary result in Taylor may be due to the 
special aggravation of culpability aspect inherent in the felony-murder rule. See generally 
Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, supra note 22, at 623-25 (discussing the felony-mur-
der rule). 
uo 296 Mass. 302, 5 N.E.2d 571 (1936). 
13
' The plaintiff was denied recovery, however, under theories of false arrest and assault. 
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In a Tennessee case, the court used a similar analysis to hold the 
deft:ndant liable for murder even though his voluntary intoxication 
at the time of the offense indicated that he lacked the recklessness 
necessary for a murder. The court focused on the defendant's ear-
lier conduct and his accompanying state of mind at the time that 
he caused the conditions of his intoxication defense."' 
Another case where the court relied on the defendant's culpabil-
ity in causing the conditions of his excuse is State v. Gooze. 133 
Gooze had a history of blackouts from Meniere's Syndrome. While 
he was driving, he suffered a blackout and ran over a pedestrian. 
He was convicted of "caus[ing] the death of another by driving [a] 
vehicle carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of 
the rights or safety of others.""' The court noted that "[i]t was 
reasonably foreseeable that if he 'blacked out' or became dizzy 
without warning, its probable consequence might well be injury or 
death to others." The court then reasoned, "while one cannot be 
liable for what he does during the unconsciousness of sleep, he is 
responsible for allowing himself to go to sleep" while driving.'" 
These torts generally require that the defendant intend the injury, and the sheriff was at 
most only negligent when he failed to complete the summons. 
132 The court stated: 
It is inconceivable that a man can get as drunk as Edwards was on that occasion 
without previously realizing that he would get in that condition if he continued to 
drink. But he did continue to drink and presumably with knowledge that he was 
going to drive his car back to, or close to, Lebanon over this heavily traveled highway. 
He knew, of course, that such conduct would be directly perilous to human life. From 
his conduct in so doing, it was permissible for the jury to imply "such a high degree 
of conscious and willful recklessness as to amount to that malignity of heart consti-
tuting malice." 
Edwards v. State, 202 Tenn. 393, 398, 304 S.W.2d 500,503 (1949) (quoting Owen v. State, 
188 Tenn. 459, 468, 221 S.W.2d 515, 519 (1957)). This case is cited in Model Penal Code 
§ 2.08 comment 3, at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) to illustrate the point that "liability may 
still arise in ... a case [where an actor's voluntary intoxication negates recklessness at the 
time of the offense] based on the actor's awareness of risk while getting drunk, as when he 
knows that he must ultimately drive a car." ld. The approach has also been employed where 
the actor causes a provocation defense. See, e.g., State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 100, 597 P.2d 
280, 285 (1979) (if defendant intentionally caused the decedent to do acts that the defen-
dant could claim provoked him, he cannot claim provocation, as his conduct shows malice 
aforethought). 
133 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (App. Div. 1951). 
134 Id. at 280, 81 A.2d at 813. 
13~ ld. at 286, 81 A.2d at 816; accord Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 
1960) (on retrial, jury in an involuntary manslaughter case could consider whether defen-
dant, an epileptic, knew at the time he drove that he might blackout). 
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E. The Problem of Otherwise Lawful Conduct that Would Be 
Punished Under Liability for Causing One's Own Defense 
Where an actor's conduct that causes the conditions of his de-
fense is an offense-for example, negligent burning or public 
drunkenness-there is little difficulty in imposing additional liabil-
ity, as proposed in this Part, if the actor causes those conditions 
with some culpability toward causing himself thus to engage in fur-
ther proscribed conduct, albeit justified or excused. 136 Where the 
conduct causing the conditions of a defense is otherwise lawful, 
however, there may be some question as to whether the actor's 
lawful conduct may be used as the basis for criminal liability; after 
all, his conduct does not appear to satisfy the conduct require-
ments of any specified offense. In the hardest case, his conduct 
· may be of a nature that is constitutionally protected. 
Assume that a known member of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization enters a meeting of the Jewish Defense League being 
held in a public place. Assume further that his purpose in doing so 
is to induce, by his mere presence, the attendees to assault him, 
thereby creating the circumstances that will justify his use of force 
against them in self-defense. One might be inclined not to punish 
his conduct in causing the circumstances justifying his use of force 
because that conduct-entering the public meeting-is otherwise 
lawful. Courts have said, for example, in speaking of fault in caus-
ing the conditions of justifications, that "[f]ault implies miscon-
duct," such as being where one has no legal right to be.'" 
This attitude, however, betrays a conception of criminal law ac-
cording to which conduct is per se either legal or illegal, and fails 
to accept the relevance of context in assessing an act's criminality. 
Almost any act, even a homicidal one, may be legal in certain situ-
ations; an execution is an obvious example, as is self-defense. Simi-
larly, an act that is usually legal may be criminal in certain situa-
tions; for example, driving along a highway may be illegal if it 
causes the death of a pedestrian standing in the middle of the 
road. 
Even when similar acts are performed in similar situations, the 
actor's state of mind as to the consequences can be determinative 
136 For examples of instances where conduct causing one's defense is criminalized, see 
supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. 
'·" State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 122, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (1963). 
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of criminality. An actor who comes into control of property that he 
knows was lost by another but who fails to report his finding is not 
guilty of theft unless he intended to deprive the owner of the prop-
erty."' A person who "antiques" his dining room furniture is not 
guilty of a crime unless he intends to defraud someone into buying 
it at an inflated price.'" A more important example of where oth-
erwise legal acts can be the basis for criminal liability if performed 
with a particular state of mind is criminal attempt. An actor who 
has tools in his possession can be convicted of attempt if he in-
tends to use them to commit a burglary."' By analogy, therefore, 
an actor may be criminally liable for entering a room of hostile 
people and eventually causing a justified killing if he did so with 
the appropriate state of mind as to causing that consequence. 
To take a less dramatic example than the P.L.O./J.D.L. case, 
consider the actor, D, who sends T a false letter claiming that he, 
D, is in possession of a watch that T treasures. D knows that the 
watch was recently stolen and that T, a person of violent temper, 
will on receipt of the letter unjustifiably attack him in an attempt 
to recover the watch. D knows nothing of the whereabouts of the 
watch, but has devised this grand scheme to permit him to kill T 
in self-defense. D's conduct in sending the letter is not itself un-
lawful. Because he did it with the intent to kill T/41 however, one 
may be inclined to hold him liable for murder, or at least at-
tempted murder."' His liability would be based on his conduct in 
causing the attack, not on his justified defensive force. 
One might have the same view toward the P.L.O. member who 
enters the J.D.L. meeting with a grand scheme of injuring the at-
138 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 223.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Theft of Prop-
erty Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake"). 
139 See, e.g., id. § 224.2 ("Simulating Objects of Antiquity, Rarity, Etc."). 
140 See, e.g., id. § 5.0l(l)(c), (2). 
,., Note that if the letter-sender or the P.L.O. member intends only to create the oppor-
tunity for a justified assault in self-defense, but ends up killing in self-defense, he may be 
held liable for the degree of homicide consistent with his culpable state of mind with regard 
to causing the death. For example, by intending an assault, he may be aware of a risk of 
causing death, and thus be liable for reckless homicide. Cf. statutes cited supra notes 34, 38 
(denying the defense for homicide even if the actor intended only to create circumstances 
justifying assault). 
142 Although one might argue that his conduct is only of the attempt variety because he 
has not at the time of the offense caused a net harm that the law punishes as a substantive 
offense, this argument is easily countered by considering the course of conduct. See supra 
note 115. 
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tendees in self-defense. The letter-sending case may seem a 
stronger one for criminal liability because the P.L.O. member is 
exercising an affirmative right of all citizens to go where they 
choose in public places, whereas the letter-sender has no affirma-
tive right to mail false letters. It seems questionable, however, to 
distinguish noncriminal acts according to how offensive or desir-
able they may be. 143 The better conclusion may be that although 
one may generally sympathize with the P.L.O. member's exercise 
of his rights to move freely in a public place, he has, by his inten-
tion to kill, acted just as improperly as the sender of the false let-
ter. It may be more difficult to prove a grand scheme intention by 
the P.L.O. member than by the letter-sender, whose actions may 
speak for themselves, but where such an intent is proven, it is an 
adequate basis for liability, even though the underlying conduct is 
otherwise lawful. 
F. Defenses to Liability for Causing One's Own Defense 
Like conduct constituting an offense, an actor's conduct in caus-
ing the conditions of his defense may be blameless under a variety 
of defenses. If his conduct is entirely accidental-as when an actor 
provokes an attack when he takes property that he mistakenly but 
reasonably believes to be his own-his accidental conduct will not 
satisfy the culpability requirements of the liability principle pro-
posed here. This outcome is analogous to the typical failure of 
proof "defense" where an actor's lack of culpability negates a cul-
pable state of mind required by an offense definition. Here, the 
liability principle requires a culpable state of mind as to causing 
the resulting offense.'" 
Even if the actor does satisfy the culpability requirements for 
causing-one's-defense liability, he should nonetheless be entitled to 
any appropriate general defense to such liability. For example, an 
actor may have set a forest fire as a justification for later burning a 
fire break, but may have done so only because he was coerced, 
thereby meriting a duress excuse for his causing the justificatory 
143 Travel in interstate or foreign commerce is generally lawful, and interstate travel is 
often considered a constitutional right, but such travel becomes a federal crime when done 
with the intent to avoid prosecution for a state felony. 18 U.S. C. § 1073 (1982). 
1 
.. No culpability is required for the underlying offense, however, where it is a strict lia-
bility crime. 
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circumstances. A C.I.A. agent may provoke an attack to conceal. 
under the guise of self-defense, a homicide justified by a spy's im-
minent attempt to leave the country with information that will 
lead to nuclear war. The agent would be entitled to a justification 
defense for creating the circumstances justifying the homicide. 
Similarly, an actor may have a justification defense for his con-
duct in creating excusing conditions. A C.I.A. agent who is squeam-
ish about carrying out an order to execute an enemy spy may go to 
a hypnotist to be given a hypnotic suggestion to carry out the law-
ful order. One may also be excused for creating excusing condi-
tions. If unknown to the agent the order to kill the spy was unlaw-
ful, the agent would be excused for his conduct in culpably 
creating his state of hypnosis. His excuse would be his reasonable 
mistake as to a justification for creating the exculpatory state of 
hypnosis. 
Current law generally fails to provide any defense where it im-
poses liability on an actor who causes the conditions of his defense. 
One area that has received attention, however, is that of voluntary 
intoxication and its effect on the availability of both the general 
excuse and the failure of proof defense for intoxication. 
1. "Involuntary" Intoxication 
Whether an actor has a defense for causing his own exculpatory 
intoxication is, in effect, the issue in determining what will consti-
tute "involuntary" or "not self-induced" intoxication.,.. The 
Model Penal Code uses the term "self-induced" intoxication, 
rather than "voluntary" intoxication, and defines that term to 
mean "intoxication caused by substances which the actor know-
ingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause in-
toxication he knows or ought to know .... "146 Apparently, the 
1u See generally J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 538 (2d ed. 1960) ("The 
initial difficulty of ascertaining the meaning of 'voluntary' intoxication results from the fail-
ure of the courts to define the term . ... The chief judicial method of elucidating the mean-
ing of 'voluntary' has been by way of generalizing the exceptions from liability. , .. "). 
Under the Model Penal Code, the general intoxication excuse is available only for "not 
self-induced" and "pathological" intoxication. Model Penal Code § 2.08(1), (4) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). In failure of proof cases, the defendant will have recklessness imputed 
to him if his intoxication is "self-induced." Id. § 2.08(2); see supra notes 45-51 and accom-
panying text. 
141
' Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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actor must know that he is introducing the substance but need 
only be negligent as to its intoxicating effect. 
To the extent that the Code incorporates the common-law doc-
trine that intoxication caused by another's fraud or artifice is in-
voluntary,'" it perhaps recognizes what is essentially a failure of 
proof defense to culpable intoxication. The Code permits a similar 
failure of proof defense when it incorporates in the definition of 
"self-induced" a provision that intoxication is not self-induced if 
the intoxicating substance was taken "pursuant to medical 
advice."148 
Under the Code, an actor also may offer a justification or excuse 
defense to a charge that the actor was culpable as to his intoxica-
tion. Intoxication is not self-induced if the actor introduced the 
substance into his body "under such circumstances as would afford 
a defense to a charge of crime.""' The "medical advice" exception 
For an additional Model Penal Code definition designed to distinguish voluntary and in-
voluntary intoxication, see infra note 151 and accompanying text. The Model Penal Code 
defines "intoxication" to mean "a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting 
from the introduction of substances into the body." ld. § 2.08(5)(a). 
"
7 The comment to the definition of self-induced intoxication notes: "Of course, intoxica-
tion caused by the fraud of another is not self-induced." Model Penal Code§ 2.08 comment 
6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). A qualification to this statement should be that the actor must 
not have been negligent in being fraudulently induced to consume the substance. Unfortu-
nately, the cases, like the Code's draftsmen, do not distinguish the two victims of trickery. 
See cases cited infra note 149. 
HB Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Like the "fraud or arti-
fice" concept, medical advice acts as a failure of proof defense only if the patient should not 
have known of the substance's intoxicating effects. For another explanation of the medical 
advice exception, see infra text accompanying note 150. 
'
49 Model Penal Code§ 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). "The draft, by its defi-
nition of intoxication which is not self-induced, would give a defense if the intoxication 
results from such duress as would afford a defense to a charge of crime." Model Penal Code 
§ 2.08 comment 6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Cases and other statutes, however, do not 
distinguish the failure of proof explanation given in the text's preceding paragraph from the 
excuse or justification explanation in this paragraph, and usually refer generally to "force or 
fraud," often in dicta. Furthermore, as with the victim of a fraud or trick, see supra note 
147, there is no attempt to determine whether the actor was culpable as to being coerced 
into taking the substance. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 439 So. 2d 800, 802 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1983) (involuntary intoxication results from force, fraud, or artifice); Easter v. District of 
Columbia, 209 A.2d 625, 627 (D.C. 1965) (involuntary intoxication is without consent, or 
through force or fraud, but cannot be caused by chronic alcoholism), modified, 361 F.2d 50 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (in cases of public intoxication, chronic alcoholism constitutes involuntary 
intoxication; relying on alternative statutory, common law, and constitutional grounds); 
People v. Walker, 33 Ill. App. 3d 681, 688, 338 N.E.2d 449, 454 (1975) (involuntary intoxica-
tion is by trick, artifice, or force); State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1981) (involuntary 
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may also operate as a specific category of justification defense to 
the extent that it envisions an actor who did know of a substance's 
intoxicatin!( effects, but consumed it anyway in reliance on his doc-
tor's advice to avert greater injury to himself."" 
The Model Penal Code also defines a condition, "pathological 
intoxication may be caused by force, fraud, or contrivance; applying a statute); Common-
wealth v. Sheehan, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 754, 759 n.4, 370 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 n.4 (1977) (involun-
tary intoxication results from forced consumption or secret administration of intoxicants), 
aff'd on other grounds, 376 Mass. 765, 383 N.E.2d 1115 (1978); City of Minneapolis v. Al-
timus, 306 Minn. 462, 468, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856 (1976) (involuntary intoxication may result 
from coercion); State v. Bishop, 632 S.W.2d 255, 258-59 (Mo. 1982) (involuntary intoxication 
may be caused where the intoxicant is forcibly administered or unwittingly ingested through 
physical compulsion, trickery, deception, or other external force); State v. Plummer, 117 
N.H. 320, 326, 374 A.2d 431, 435 (1977) (involuntary intoxication may be a product of fraud, 
force, or coercion); People v. Carlo, 46 A.D.2d 764, 764, 361 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169-70 (1974) 
(fraud may produce involuntary intoxication); State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 457, 196 S.E.2d 
777, 786 (1973) (involuntary intoxication may be intoxication induced by force or coercion); 
Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1258 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (involuntary intoxication may 
be caused by fraud, trickery, or duress), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Burns v. State, 
591 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (involuntary intoxication may be caused by 
fraud or duress); Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 247 N.W.2d 116, 122 (1976) 
(involuntary intoxication may be induced by force or fraud). 
The "defense" language of the Model Penal Code section may be too broad, moreover, in 
that it seems to render the intoxication involuntary whenever the defendant would have any 
defense to any offense. For example, just because the circumstances of the drinking would 
give the defendant a defense to "drinking in public"~i.e., the drinking was done lawfully, in 
that sense, by being done in private-this does not mean that it should be considered invol-
untary intoxication. 
1 ~ 0 As with the "force or fraud" cases, there is apparently no coherent view as to whether 
medical advice acts as proof of nonnegligence as to the substance's effects or as proof of a 
justification for taking an acknowledged risk. Compare Perkins v. United States, 228 F. 408, 
415-16 (4th Cir. 1915) (warnings printed on prescription and actor's experience with the 
drug are relevant to the issue of voluntariness); Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654, 
658-59 (Ky. 1955) (actor who neither knew of nor had reason to foresee prescription drug's 
intoxicating effect cannot be guilty of a negligence offense); and City of Minneapolis v. Al-
timus, 306 Minn. 462, 469-71, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856-57 (1976) (actor who neither knew nor 
had reason to know of prescription drug's intoxicating effect may claim insanity defense); 
with Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 534-35, 115 S.E. 673, 677 (1923) (intoxication 
is voluntary if actor drinks whiskey to relieve pain but does not do so pursuant to medical 
advice; the court implied, therefore, that had the whiskey been taken upon advice, the in-
toxication might be involuntary). 
Other cases are ambiguous. See, e.g., Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md. 412,425, 143 A.2d 70,77 
(1958) (intoxication caused by unskilled administration of a drug by a physician ordinarily 
constitutes a defense) (dictum); State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 326, 374 A.2d 431, 435 
(1977) (involuntary intoxication may result where substances are ingested pursuant to medi-
cal prescription); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1258 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (ignorance of 
the effects of prescribed medication may result in involuntary intoxication), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1155 (1983). 
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intoxication," that provides an additional means of establishing in-
voluntary intoxication. It permits the intoxication to be deemed 
involuntary where it is "grossly excessive in degree, given the 
amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is 
susceptible."'" Thus, the actor's intoxication is pathological if the 
actor does not know his susceptibility to the intoxicant.'" Even if 
one accepted the Code's decision to equate culpability as to intoxi-
cation with culpability as to the offense, however, this provision 
might be as improperly lenient as the "self-induced" provision is 
improperly harsh. An actor may be reckless but not "know" that 
he is susceptible to an abnormally high intoxicating effect from a 
substance, yet may successfully use this "pathological" intoxication 
to negate the recklessness needed for manslaughter (reckless 
homicide).'" 
131 Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); accord N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:2-8(e)(3) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (Model Penal Code formulation); cf. Hawaii Rev. 
Stat. § 702-230(3)(c) (1976) (adds to the Model Penal Code formulation a requirement that 
the pathological intoxication must result from a physical abnormality of the defendant). 
Some would argue that such pathological intoxication defenses are inadequate to deal with 
drug intoxication; the argument considers research indicating that drugs, unlike alcohol, 
produce unpredictable results and, in effect, the drug "tricks" the defendant. See Special 
Project, Drugs and Criminal Responsibility, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1145, 1181-82 (1980). This 
intoxication would not be "pathological" because the actor anticipates intoxication, but it 
may be nonculpable because the actor does not anticipate the effect of the intoxicant. 
1 ~2 This provision "is designed to provide a defense in a few, extremely rare, cases in 
which an intoxicating substance is knowingly taken into the body and, because of a bodily 
abnormality, intoxication of an extreme and unusual degree results." Model Penal Code 
§ 2.08 comment 7, at 11 (Tent. Draft No.9, 1959). There is some authority for such a basis 
for "involuntary" intoxication. See, e.g., Leggett v. State, 21 Tex. Crim. 382,398-99, 17 S.W. 
159, 161 (1886) (defendant given defense where he drank liquor insufficient to cause intoxi-
cation and later received a blow to the head that caused the liquor to produce gross 
intoxication). 
153 It appears that an actor may introduce evidence of pathological intoxication to negate 
any offense element. The Model Penal Code provides that "intoxication .. is not a de-
fense unless it negatives an element of the offense." Model Penal Code § 2.08(1) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). For similar statutes in other jurisdictions, see supra note 45 and accom-
panying text. By implication, intoxication is a defense under such provisions if it does ne-
gate an element. Model Penal Code § 2.08(2) then prohibits intoxication from negating 
recklessness when the intoxication is "self-induced." It provides no such bar to "pathologi-
cal" intoxication; thus presumably, like other forms of involuntary intoxication, pathological 
intoxication is permitted to negate any culpability requirement, including recklessness. 
One could argue that all cases of pathological intoxication are, by definition, cases of self-
induced intoxication. Indeed, the definitions of "pathological" and "self-induced" intoxica-
tion seem to compel such an interpretation. An actor who becomes grossly intoxicated upon 
drinking two cans of beer after a three day fast and who does not know that he will be 
susceptible to such gross intoxication under such circumstances may be pathologically intox-
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2. The Problem of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction 
Alcoholism (or alcohol addiction, as it may properly be called) 
may be a defense to causing one's own intoxication, but it presents 
special problems that illustrate the potential complexities in evalu-
ating defenses to liability for causing one's own defense. If it could 
be shown that the physiologically addicted actor's compulsion to 
take drugs is as overpowering as the compulsions sufficient to ex-
cuse under either the insanity or duress defenses,'" the compul-
sion might be sufficient to establish that the addict's intoxication 
is involuntary.'" When the addiction is purely psychological, how-
ever, it may be more difficult to determine the strength of the 
compulsion. 166 
icated. Id. § 2.08(5)(c), quoted supra in text accompanying note 151; see also Model Penal 
Code § 2.08 comment 7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (giving a similar hypothetical as an exam-
ple of pathological intoxication). It would also seem, however, that the actor's intoxication is 
"self-induced." He "knowingly introduce[ d)" a substance-beer-"the tendency of which to 
cause intoxication" he "ought to [have known]." Model Penal Code§ 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962), quoted supra text accompanying note 146. 
Under this view, § 2.08(2) would be read to bar pathological intoxication from negating 
recklessness, just as self-induced intoxication is barred. On the other hand, one could argue 
that because the drafters have carefully distinguished and separately defined self-induced 
intoxication and pathological intoxication, by expressly limiting § 2.08(2) only to cases of 
the former, they meant to exclude cases of the latter from the operation of that section. In 
other words, pathological intoxication would be permitted to negate recklessness. There 
seems little theoretical justification, however, not to accord both forms of involuntary intox-
ication similar effect. Thus, the interpretation adopted in the text should be preferred. 
The rationales supporting a limitation of the failure of proof defense for one who has, in 
the ordinary sense of the word, induced his intoxication do not support such a limitation for 
one who is pathologically intoxicated. The pathologically intoxicated actor neither risked 
becoming and acting drunk nor demonstrated moral culpability by engaging in conduct 
known to destroy the powers of perception and judgment. See Model Penal Code § 2.08 
comment 3, at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (actor who induces his intoxication does take such 
risks and demonstrate such culpability). One might well question the rationales for denying 
the defense even to the actor whose intoxication was truly self-induced. See supra text ac-
companying notes 49-50. 
154 See Lowenstein, Addiction, Insanity, and Due Process of Law: An Examination of the 
Capacity Defense, 3 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 125, 146-47 (1967); Special Project, supra note 
151, at 1198-99. 
166 See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 20, at 350 (comparing alcohol versus 
narcotics addiction in establishing involuntariness); Special Project, supra note 151, at 1183-
84 (discussing intoxication and involuntariness). 
ue Bowman, Narcotic Addiction and Criminal Responsibility Under Durham, 53 Geo. 
L.J. 1017,1036-37 (1965), argues that in psychologically-induced addiction, the addict's un-
derlying psychological disorder leads him, but not the normal person, to relieve his anxiety 
through the drug. The degree of dependence, therefore, varies with the individual's underly-
ing disorder. 
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The dispute over the significance of addiction for criminal liabil-
ity arises from disagreements not only over the effects of addiction, 
but also over the actor's ability to control the process of addiction. 
Once it is possible to speak cogently of an actor's control over be-
coming addicted, the causing-one's-defense analysis proposed 
above becomes appropriate in determining whether an addict mer-
its an excuse either for his offense conduct or for his conduct in 
causing the conditions of his intoxication defense. Society may 
withhold a defense based on 1 addiction where the addiction was 
voluntary and provide the defense only when the addiction was 
involuntary. 
There are three distinct difficulties with this line of analysis. 
First, although the terms "voluntary" and "involuntary," as ap-
plied both to addiction and intoxication, are time-honored compo-
nents of the standard vocabulary, they are inexact substitutes for 
the concept of culpability. Second, the issue of whether a particu-
lar person is voluntarily (or culpably) addicted is complex. There 
are clearly cases of addiction that the actor has no part in creat-
ing.1" More often, an actor who intentionally takes drugs may be 
only reckless or negligent as to becoming addicted; rarely does an 
actor intend to become addicted. 1" This difficulty in ascertaining 
an actor's culpability as to becoming addicted raises many of the 
problems discussed above with regard to the definition of "volun-
tary" intoxication1" and with regard to differing levels of culpabil-
ity in causing one's own excusing conditions.160 Another complicat-
ing factor is the actor's reduced capacity to foresee the ultimate 
addictive effect once he has taken the first drink, pill, or 
injection. 161 
167 For example, addiction may be caused by medical treatment. See Bowman, supra note 
156, at 1030. The number of such addictions, however, seems to be minimal. See id; Fin-
garette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 Yale L.J. 413, 428 (1975). 
~~~ One author posits that the use of narcotics does not "even usually" lead to addiction. 
See Bowman, supra note 156, at 1036. He argues that it is the individual's pre-existing psy-
chological defects that cause his reaction to the drug to lead to addiction. Id. Contra Fin-
garette, supra note 157, at 431-33 (arguing that social factors cause most addiction). 
169 One problem is the difficulty in formulating a definition of voluntary that properly 
distinguishes culpable and nonculpable intoxication. See supra notes 145, 149-50; see gener-




0 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32, 45-51 (discussing the impropriety of barring 
a defense on the basis of negligence where the offense requires higher culpability). 
161 See Bowrnan, supra note 156, at 1036 (for the addiction-prone person, the first experi-
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The issue is complicated still further by evidence that some are 
more addiction-prone than others.'"' One's existing genetic and 
psychological state may arguably combine with environmental fac-
tors to create a tendency toward addiction. Ascertaining the addic-
tion's original cause, which may have occurred years before the ad-
diction, is notably more complicated and more speculative than 
determining whether an actor's intoxication was voluntary (or 
culpable). 
Perhaps most important, the inquiry into the voluntariness of an 
actor's addiction is indeterminative. The critical issue is not the 
actor's culpability as to creating the conditions of his ex-
cuse-whether the excuse be intoxication or addiction-but rather 
is the actor's culpability as to subsequently committing the ex-
cused criminal offense.'6 ' · 
When addiction is used as the excuse, the complexities of deter-
mining the voluntariness of the addiction may render truly specu-
lative the inquiry into the actor's culpable state of mind at the 
time of creating the addiction as to the commission of that subse-
quent substantive offense. The inquiry, however, is not impossible. 
As a starting point, one might assume that a person who knowingly 
becomes addicted is at least aware of a risk that the addiction may 
result in a compulsion to steal or possess illegal drugs. 
When addiction is raised as a defense to causing one's own ex-
cusing conditions, however, the opposite assumption might be 
drawn. It seems entirely unlikely that the actor, at the time of 
causing the addiction, would have had any culpable state of mind 
as to the ultimate offense that was to be excused by the addiction-
induced intoxication. The actor would have to have been aware at 
the first instance that his consumption would eventually cause ad-
diction, that would in turn cause subsequent involuntary intoxica-
tion, that would in turn cause him to misperceive the nature of his 
conduct, misunderstand the legal rules governing his conduct, or 
lose control of his conduct, and thereby commit the criminal of-
ence with intoxicants is more than just pleasurable; he develops a psychological craving that 
he probably cannot ignore, and addiction is virtually inevitable for him). 
•n See Bowman, supra note 156, at 1029-39. 
1 ~ 3 See supra section II(C). If an actor becomes grossly intoxicated with the purpose of 
then killing his wife, he is appropriately convicted of murder; if he becomes intoxicated 
while aware of a substantial risk that he will beat his wife while drunk, manslaughter (reck-
less homicide) is more appropriate. 
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fense. Given the unlikelihood of such a culpable state of mind, an 
actor who raises addiction as a defense to causing his own excusing 
conditions (as in involuntary intoxication). especially if he was ad-
diction-prone.'" should be able to maintain his intoxication de-
fense. This only means, however, that his intoxication is to be 
viewed as "involuntary." To escape liability he must still satisfy 
the requirements of the defense. He must establish, for example, 
that the effect of his involuntary intoxication on this occasion sat-
isfies the cognitive or control dysfunctions of the general involun-
tary intoxication excuse. 16~ 
III. PRoBLEMs, SoLuTIONs, AND CoMPROMISEs IN TRANSLATING 
THEORY INTO WoRKABLE DocTRINE 
A. Translating Theory into Doctrine 
The causing-one's-defense analysis proposed in Part II can be 
translated into clear doctrine through the following provisions: 
CAUSING THE CoNDITIONS OF ONE's OwN GENERAL DEFENSE 
(1) Causing Justifying Circumstances or Excusing Conditions No 
Bar to Defense. The fact that an actor has caused the circum-
stances giving rise to the need for his justified conduct or that an 
actor has caused the conditions giving rise to his excuse shall not 
itself bar the justification or excuse defense for the actor. 
(2) Liability for Causing Justifying Circumstances or Excusing 
Conditions. An actor is guilty of an offense when acting with the 
culpability required by the offense definition he causes the circum-
stances that justify his [or another's]'" engaging in the conduct 
that constitutes the offense or causes the conditions that excuse 
himself [or another] for engaging in the conduct that constitutes 
the offense, and he [or such other person] engages in the conduct 
constituting the offense. 
(3) Defenses to Liability for Causing Conditions of One's Defense. 
164 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
m A few state supreme courts have held, however, that an alcoholic's intoxication is vol-
untary. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 645 P.2d 155, 160 (Alaska 1982); State v. Johnson, 327 
N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1982); Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 513-16, 247 N.W.2d 116, 122-24 
(1916). 
166 The bracketed language would be needed only if the code did not contain a provision 
imposing liability for causing crime by an innocent, such as Model Penal Code § 2.06(2)(a) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a discussion of this provision and its overlap with caus-
ing the conditions of one's own defense, see supra notes 116, 121. 
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An actor may have a justification or excuse defense to liability 
under subsection (2) for hia conJud in causing ihe conditions of 
his exculpation. 
Similarly, the theory developed in Part II suggests a doctrine to 
govern "failure of proof' defenses. Intoxication negating an offense 
element is the most common such defense raising causing-one's-
defense issues: 
INTOXICATION NEGATING AN OFFENSE ELEMENT 
(1) Evidence of intoxication, voluntary or involuntary, may be ad-
mitted into evidence to negate a culpability element of an offense. 
(2) If an actor's intoxication negates a required culpability element 
at the time of the offense, such element is nonetheless established 
if the actor satisfied such element immediately preceding or during 
the time that he was becoming intoxicated or at any time thereaf-
ter until commission of the offense, and the harm or evil he in-
tended, contemplated, or risked is brought about by the actor's 
subsequent conduct during intoxication. 
(3) An actor may have a justification or excuse defense to liability 
under subsection (2) for his conduct in causing the conditions of 
his exculpation. 
Thus, the translation from theory to doctrine is relatively easy. 
Difficulties arise, however, not in making the translation, but in 
guaranteeing the feasibility or workability of the resulting doctrine. 
B. Complexity Problems 
The provisions implementing the proposed causing-one's-defense 
analysis can be complex. The complexity raises two questions. Can 
jurors reasonably be expected to understand and apply the doc-
trine? Can complex doctrine serve the deterrent functions of the 
criminal law? 
I. The Jury 
One objection to any attempt at a refined solution to the caus-
ing-one's-defense problem is the claim that these solutions com-
monly require jury instructions of such complexity that the jury 
cannot reasonably be expected to understand and apply them.'" 
181 For example, in rejecting the proposal of Professors Smith and Williams that would 
52 ·virginia Lau; Review [Vol. 71:1 
One response is that instructions under these rules are within the 
range of complexity currently tolerated; many existing instructions 
are extremely complex.'"' On the other hand, the doctrine may re-
quire somewhat more complicated and more numerous determina-
tions than do many current issues. For example, the jury must 
evaluate the actor's conduct and state of mind not only at the time 
of the conduct constituting the offense, but also at the time he 
brought about the defense conditions. The latter determination is 
especially complicated because the jury must evaluate the actor's 
state of mind at a past time-when he caused the defense condi-
tions-with respect to the then future ultimate offense. Further-
more, in some cases, the jury would also be required to decide 
whether the actor had an excuse or a justification defense at the 
time he brought about the defense conditions. The complexity is 
undeniable. The issue, however, is whether the additional complex-
ity will prevent jurors from understanding the doctrine or, even if 
they understand the doctrine, from applying it. 
Recent studies demonstrate that jurors have a poor understand-
ing of traditional jury instructions.'" Research also indicates, how-
have addressed cases of voluntary intoxication negating an element, discussed infra text 
accompanying note 198, the Criminal Law Revision Committee noted that the Smith-Wil-
liams resolution "would add to the already considerable number of matters which a jury 
often has to consider ... {making] the jury's task even more difficult than it is at present 
."Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report: Offences Against the Person, 
Cmnd. 7844, 11 264, at 114 (1980). The Committee also noted that the inquriy would create 
another issue on which the jury might disagree. ld. 
' 68 See, e.g., E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions§§ 27.04-.05 
(3d ed. 1977), for model instruction on conspiracy. The instruction requires nine paragraphs 
describing respectively the "gist of the offense," what kind of association is inadequate, 
what the evidence must show and what it need not show with respect to agreement, what 
the evidence need not and must show with respect to the plan, what is and is not adequate 
knowledge of the plan and the participation required, the meaning of willful participation, 
the responsibility of one who joins an ongoing conspiracy, and the law governing the use of 
evidence of acts and declarations of co-conspirators. See also Schwarzer, Communicating 
with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 731, 745-46 & n.71 (1981) (quoting, 
criticizing, and reformulating the Devitt and Blackmar model instruction). 
169
- One study showed that individual jurors comprehended only 53.1% of the instructions 
that they received, and jurors who combined efforts reached a comprehension level of 
63.3~;,. Furthermore, 83% of criminal jurors could not respond accurately to the question 
"what is proof of guilt?" Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 601, 614-15. 
Other studies indicate that jurors cannot select correct definitions of legal terms as funda-
mental to their duties as "preponderance of the evidence," "burden of proof," "impeach," 
and "inference"; over one-half of the jurors in one study selected "a slow and careful 
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ever, that the complexity of the legal concept being conveyed is not 
a prirnary rea::son fur the jury's con1prehension problen1;:;;.170 Re-
searchers and commentators instead identify the following contrib-
uting factors: the practice of delivering instructions after the evi-
dence is received,171 the practice of delivering only verbal 
instructions,"' the use of legal jargon, 173 the length of the instruc-
tions (in particular, the tendency to incorporate detailed state-
ments of the law with refined qualifications and exceptions, rather 
than broad understandable statements of principle),"' illogical or-
ganization of the instructions,"' and a reliance on abstract legal 
statements rather than a focus on the specific factual inquiries ne-
pondering of the evidence" as the correct meaning for "preponderance of the evidence." 
Schwarzer, supra note 168, at 741. In a test of Florida's model jury charges, only 50% of the 
jurors understood that the defendant was not required to produce evidence of his innocence. 
Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Judicature 478, 480-81 (1976); 
see also Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 
1 Law & Hum. Behav. 163, 175-76 (1977) (presentation of pattern instructions to the jury 
was no more effective than not presenting instructions at all); see generally Charrow & 
Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury In-
structions, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1306, 1308 n.8 (1979) (listing published studies on juror 
comprehension). 
170 In one study, attorneys were requested to evaluate the difficulty of the legal concepts 
conveyed in particular jury instructions. Assuming the accuracy of the attorney evaluations, 
the research revealed that conceptual complexity plays a secondary role in the comprehensi-
bility of jury instructions. Charow & Charrow, supra note 169, at 1334-35. 
171 See Avakian, Let's Learn to Instruct the Jury ... Before the Trial, During the Trial 
and Before Final Argument, Judges' J. Summer 1979, at 40, 42-43; Forston, supra note 169, 
at 620-23; Prettyman; Jury Instructions~First or Last?, 46 A.B.A. J. 1066, 1066 (1960); 
Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 Hastings L.J. 456, 469-71 (1962); Comment, Memory, 
Magic, and Myth: The Timing of Jury Instructions, 59 Or. L. Rev. 451, 453-56 (1981). 
m See Forston, supra note 169, at 619-20; Joiner, From the Bench, in The Jury System in 
America: A Critical Overview 151 (R. Simon ed. 1975) (stating a preference for both oral and 
written instructions, and describing jurors' use of written instructions); Schwarzer, supra 
note 168, at 756-57 (advocating written instructions). 
113 See Charrow & Charrow, supra note 169, at 1321-28, 1358-60; Forston, supra note 169, 
at 616-18; Schwarzer, supra note 168, at 740-43; Winslow, supra note 171, at 459-60. 
m See Joiner, supra note 172, at 150-51 (arguing for understandable statements of princi-
ple and not detail, indicating that qualifications and exceptions cannot be absorbed and 
applied by the rank and file). Schwarzer argues that listeners have a limited ability to as-
similate, and that the process of listening requires them to select and exclude information. 
The selection process, one of overgeneralization, may cause the jury to acquire ideas differ-
ent than those the speaker intended to convey. Schwarzer, supra note 168, at 741-42. For a 
comparison of instructions based on statements of general principles of negligence with in-
structions composed of lengthy expositions on negligence, contributory negligence and prox-
imate cause, see Winslow, supra note 171, at 460-69. 
m SeeR. McBride, The Art of Instructing the Jury§ 5.03, at 183 (1969); Forston, supra 
note 169, at 619. 
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cessitated by the evidence."" 
The causing-one's-defense doctrine suggested here would not im-
plicate the factors that foster jury confusion. Several of these fac-
tors-the timing and manner of delivery, the simplicity of lan-
guage, and the logical ordering of the instructions-are unrelated 
to the conceptual content of the instructions. For the remaining 
factors, the proposed causing-one's-defense doctrine, although 
complex, does not rely on abstract legal statements or on detailed 
or refined qualifications and exceptions to the law. 
Indeed, in light of this research on juror comprehension, the pro-
posed causing-one's-defense doctrine may well foster juror under-
standing. Unlike artificial legal abstractions that are designed to 
further unstated public policies, the doctrine does not consist of a 
host of apparently meaningless and unprincipled rules and excep-
tions.177 Instead, it is a theory of liability based on a general princi-
ple easily stated in ordinary language: If the actor caused the con-
ditions of his defense and at the time he caused those conditions 
he had the culpable state of mind required by the offense, he is 
guilty of the offense. In other words, after the jury is instructed as 
to the state of mind requirements of the underlying offense, they 
may be instructed that "the defendant may satisfy these elements 
either at the time of the offense or at the time he causes the condi-
tions of a defense." 
Furthermore, the general principles of liability and exculpation 
that inform the proposed doctrine comport with our collective 
sense of justice. They recognize that blameworthiness is critical to 
m As one author has noted, studies showing that prior knowledge of or exposure to a 
situation is a significant element of comprehension "provide a powerful argument against 
the use of abstract statements of legal principles and for the use of instructions phrased as 
concrete statements of the questions to be decided, incorporating the evidentiary context of 
persons, places, things, and events disclosed at trial." Schwarzer, supra note 168, at 741; see 
generally Winslow, supra note 171, at 469· 73 (arguing that jury instructions should be indi-
vidually tailored to each case). For a discussion of "process" instructions designed to permit 
jurors to decide legal questions raised by the case in a logical order dictated by the law and 
evidence, see Taylor, Buchanan, Pryor & Strawn, Avoiding the Legal Tower of Babel: A 
Case Study of Innovative Jury Instruction, Judges' J., Summer 1980, at 10. 
171 Existing law is often stated in terms of these rules and exceptions. See, e.g., Model 
Penal Code § 3.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining the law of defense of property 
governing recapture and reentry in terms of numerous exceptions and qualifications to the 
general principle); see Model Penal Code§ 3.06 comment 14 (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958) (sug-
gesting that the limitations and exceptions are designed, in part, to require certain victims 
of property aggression to seek relief in the courts). 
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both the assignment and degree of criminal liability. Thus, the 
causing-one's-defense doctrine, while requiring the jury to make 
complex factual findings, does not require the jury to understand 
and apply abstract or artificial rules or exceptions to general prin-
ciples. Rather, the doctrine is a logical extension of general princi-
ples of criminal liability. 
To illustrate the practical benefit of a doctrine that mirrors gen-
eral principles of justice, compare the explanations required to im-
plement the rules on intoxication negating an offense element, as 
adopted in the Model Penal Code, with those required by the pro-
posed causing-one's-defense doctrine. Model Penal Code § 2.08 re-
quires an instruction on the definition of "self-induced intoxica-
tion. "178 This legal definition is extremely abstract, requiring an 
instruction explaining that intoxication that is not self-induced 
may negate any offense element"• and an explanation that intoxi-
cation that is self-induced may negate purpose or knowledge but 
may not negate recklessness.'" Correct verdicts depend on the ju-
rors' ability to comprehend, recall, and apply these abstract rules 
and exceptions. The complexity will be multiplied where one of-
fense requires a variety of mental states. 191 The Model Penal Code 
rules appear to be as artificial as they are complicated; the jurors 
are told that one kind of intoxication may negate any mental ele-
ment and that another may not. Clearly, the reason must appear to 
the jurors to be the artificial rule and not some difference between 
the two kinds of intoxication and their relevance to proving the 
actor's state of mind.182 
118 Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
179 ld. § 2.08(1). 
180 ld. § 2.08(2). 
181 For example, robbery requires proof of a theft or attempted theft, both of which re-
quire purpose. See, e.g., id. § 5.01 ("Criminal Attempt"); id. § 221.1 ("Robbery"); id. 
§ 223.2 (''Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition"). One form of robbery requires proof of 
the infliction of serious bodily harm, an element as to which the actor must only be reckless. 
See. e.g., id. §§ 2.02(3), 222.l(l)(a). 
182 Here, the artificial rule is based on a postulated equivalence of the risk an actor takes 
in becoming drunk and the risk created by his drunken conduct. Model Penal Code § 2.08 
comment 3, at 8-9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The rule is also designed to compensate for 
difficulties of proof. ld. 
There can be no question, however, that where there is no relationship between what the 
actor risks in becoming drunk and the harm he causes, the rule distorts the general principle 
that requires culpability as to the objective elements of the offense. Thus, the jury is 
presented with conflicting rules: one requires proof of culpability, and one dispenses with 
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In contrast, the causing-one's-defense doctrine requires a single 
explanation. If the actor had the required mental state either at 
the time he committed the offense or at the time he caused his 
intoxication, he is guilty of the offense. There is nothing complex 
or artificial in the application of the principle. It is both compre-
hensible and simple. 
In addition to its simplicity, the causing-one's-defense doctrine 
provides something that other researchers view as a necessary rem-
edy to jury misunderstanding: instructions that present questions 
in a logical sequence related to the evidence presented.18' The 
causing-one's-defense doctrine requires instructions that compel 
specific chronologically ordered factual findings, and thus, if re-
searchers are correct, its use may increase juror comprehension. 
2. General Deterrence 
The proposed causing-one's-defense doctrine may also be criti-
cized as being too complex to adequately serve the criminal law's 
goal of general deterrence. Complex doctrines in criminal law have 
been criticized because the law cannot deter potential offenders 
from engaging in prohibited conduct if the rules of liability are too 
complex for people to understand. 1" As was the case with com-
plexity in jury instructions, however, complexity is less detrimental 
if it derives from consistent application of general principles of lia-
bility and exculpation that are consistent with a collective sense of 
justice. 
Consistent application of such general principles might even en-
the requirement. It is interesting to note that a classic study on jury performance revealed 
that jurors often either did not understand or chose to ignore instructions that precluded 
them from considering intoxication as a defense to certain crimes. See H. Kalven, Jr. & H. 
Zeisel, The American Jury 334-38 (1966). 
18
' Taylor, Buchanan, Pryor & Strawn, supra note 176, discuss problem solving in a small 
group, and stress the benefit of step-by-step patterns for such a group. Research on the 
significance of "goal clarity" and "goal path clarity" led to the development of "process" or 
step-by-step instructions for. a Florida criminal trial. See also Joiner, supra note 172 (stating 
preference for use of particularized questions detailing issues that the jury must resolve to 
reach a verdict). 
18
' To Livingston, who stressed the importance of utility, the "legitimacy of the law de-
pended upon its being readily knowable and known." Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal 
Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, 78 Colum L. Rev. 1098, 1100-02 (1978) {noting that Living-
ston strove to make the law plain, unequivocal, and understandable); see also Joiner, supra 
note 172, at 150-51 (equating the need for understandable statements of principles of law 
both in jury instructions and in laws regulating behavior). 
1985] Causing One's Own Defense 57 
hance public understanding of and adherence to the criminal law. 
To recognize general excuses that exculpate the blameless, for ex-
ample, demonstrates that the law is just, and thereby encourages 
compliance and lends credibility to its condemnatory function.'" 
Similarly, because the causing-one's-defense doctrine comports 
with the general culpability principle and assures a defense when 
and only when an actor is sufficiently blameless-rather than when 
certain arbitrary and artificial rules are satisfied"6-the doctrine 
fosters both general understanding of and compliance with the law. 
If general principles consistent with our collective sense of justice 
shape a doctrine, the doctrine will likely be understood and viewed 
as just. In essence, doctrines that comport with our collective sense 
of justice are as essential to a system of criminal law based on de-
terrence'"' as they are to one based on blameworthiness and just 
deserts. 188 
C. Difficulties of Proof 
A different type of objection to the causing-one's-defense provi-
sions set out above is that they require the proof of culpable states 
of mind that would, in practice, be difficult to prove. 189 As noted, 
In See Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 Cambridge L.J. 273, 282-83, 287-88 (1968); 
see also P. Brett, An Inquiry Into Criminal Guilt (1963) (arguing that society's system of 
merit and blame demands punishment only of the responsible); A Goldstein, supra note 107, 
at 16 (arguing that each of the theories underlying criminal law-retribution and rehabilita-
tion-justifies punishment of only those actors who are capable of choosing how they will 
behave). 
186 As noted previously, by virtue of their artificiality, many rules treating problems of 
the actor who causes his defense sometimes provide a defense to the blameworthy, see, e.g., 
supra text accompanying note 40, and sometimes bar a defense for the actor who is blame-
less, see supra text accompanying notes 18-22. 
187 Bentham and Livingston recognized that laws contrary to the public opinion should be 
avoided as they are unenforceable and therefore detrimental to the overall utility of the 
criminal law. See Kadish, supra note 184, at 1102. 
11* The Model Penal Code is based, in part, on principles of just deserts and culpability. 
See Model Penal Code § 1.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (listing among its purposes 
the prohibition of inexcusable and unjustifiable conduct, the safeguarding of faultless con-
duct, and the reasonable differentiation between serious and minor offenses). Professor 
Wechsler, principal architect of the Code, noted that its contents, including its prohibitions 
and excuses, should be shaped by relating the Code's rules and principles to the fundamen-
tal moral assumptions of society. Wechsler, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of 
American Criminal Law, in Crime, Criminology and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Sir 
Leon Radzinowicz 419, 424-25 (R. Hood ed. 1974). 
189 The Model Penal Code drafters rejected a proposal that would base liability in the 
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the relevant issue is not the actor·s culpable state of mind at the 
time of the conduct constituting the offense, but rather his state of 
mind as to the offense when he causes the conditions of his 
defense. 
One response to this objection is to note that culpable state of 
mind elements always present difficult proof problems. The jury is 
always left to speculate as to the existence of a state of mind that 
cannot be proven directly but only through circumstantial evi-
dence. Given the inherent difficulty in proving any culpable state 
of mind, a shift in the time focus may not make the proof 
problems so much more difficult that they become insurmounta-
ble. Yet one cannot deny that proof is more difficult and that this 
increase is- significant. In both cases, the jury must use indirect 
means to reconstruct the defendant's state of mind at a time long 
past. The analysis proposed here adds another difficulty, however. 
In the normal criminal case, the factfinder must determine the ac-
tor's past state of mind as to conduct elements of the offense that 
he was at that moment committing.••• The causing-one's-defense 
inquiry, by contrast, temporally separates the relevant state of 
mind from the ultimate event or conduct that objectively 
manifests the criminal offense. The factfinder, therefore, can no 
longer readily infer from the actor's conduct the actor's state of 
mind as to that conduct. 
D. Presumptions as a Solution to the Problems of Proof 
Despite the unique obstacles attending a factfinder's application 
of the causing-one's-defense provisions, a legislature could con-
clude that they do not entail a significant increase in difficulty 
over the routine criminal case. Even if the problems of proof are 
significantly more difficult and even if it is unrealistic to expect 
the state to prove such culpable state of mind requirements be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the proposed analysis might remain tena-
ble. To realize the virtues of the proposal, the legislature could in-
case of drunkenness on the actor's state of mind at the time of becoming intoxicated. Model 
Penal Code § 2.08 comment 3, at 7-8 (Tent. Dr!lft No. 9, 1959). The Advisory Committee 
noted the "impressive difficulties posed in litigating the foresight of any particular actor at 
the time when he imbibes." Id. at 9. 
19° For a historical analysis of the evidentiary difficulties in proving past subjective states 
of mind, see generally Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 
Hastings L.J. 815, 844-46 (1980). 
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elude an evidentiary provision that would make the state's task 
nwre fea:-:;ible. One .such provision would be a rebuttable presump-
tion of culpability that would be triggered by a threshold showing 
of the defendant's culpability. 
Another approach is to require that the state carry only the bur-
den of production on the issue of an actor's culpable state of mind 
as to the offense at the time he causes his defense. Once the state 
has produced some evidence, the actor would then have the burden 
of persuading the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at 
the time he caused his defense, he lacked the culpable state of 
mind required by the offense. A similar approach is to maintain 
the state's burden of persuasion on such an issue but to reduce the 
standard of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt to proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Both approaches, however, are 
likely to be politically unfeasible because they appear to contradict 
strongly-held views on the proper allocation and standard of the 
burden of persuasion. 
A somewhat less accurate but possibly more feasible approach 
would be to modify an existing, accepted doctrine, such as Model 
Penal Code § 2.08(2). That section permits voluntary intoxication 
to negate purpose or knowledge, but imputes recklessness as to the 
offense elements in all cases where the actor would have been 
aware of the risk had he been sober. 191 Section 2.08(2) is in essence 
an irrebutable presumption of recklessness as to the offense ele-
ments. The legislature could modify it to make the presumption 
rebuttable. Accordingly, the defendant would escape or reduce his 
liability by showing that he was not reckless or negligent as to the 
offense both at the time he became intoxicated and at the time of 
the alleged offense. The state could increase the defendant's liabil-
ity by showing that when he became intoxicated, he was knowing 
or purposeful as to the offense.192 
ut Model Penal Code § 2.08(1), (2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
>u Thus, where the state establishes that the defendant committed a homicide and pro-
duces evidence that he was at least reckless as to causing his victim's death, the state will 
normally merit a conviction for reckless homicide. The state could also produce further evi-
dence to show that at the time of the killing, the defendant acted either purposefully or 
knowingly. If the defendant came forward with evidence of intoxication, the state would be 
entitled to a presumption that the defendant, who killed in an intoxicated state, was at least 
reckless as to his victim's death. The defendant would be free to convince the jury that he 
was neither reckless nor negligent as to causing death at either the time of the homicide or 
at the time he became intoxicated. The state, on the other hand, would be free to establish 
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Each of these three approaches reduces the state's burden of 
persuasion as to one or more elements of the alleged offense, and 
each therefore may well be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's 
decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur193 and Patterson v. New York'" 
may bar such an allocation. The Court requires a state to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the offense with which 
the defendant is charged.'9 ' This result highlights the obvious in-
consistency between barring an allocation of the burden of persua-
sion to the defendant yet permitting in Model Penal Code 
§ 2.08(2) what is essentially a codified irrebuttable presumption.'•• 
It also illustrates the general danger of constitutionalizing such 
procedural preferences and thus limiting the kinds of reforms that 
a legislature may attempt. 
One way of avoiding the Mullaney-Patterson trap is to retain 
the state's traditional burden of proof on elements of an offense, 
but to create a separate, affirmative defense that the defendant 
has the burden of proving. 197 Commentators have already proposed 
the essential ingredients to such a scheme in the use of intoxica-
tion as a failure of proof defense. Professors J. C. Smith and 
Glanville Williams, in their proposal to the Criminal Law Revision 
Commission in England, suggest that an actor who is found 
nonculpable of an underlying offense because of his intoxication 
should be convicted of the proposed crime of "Dangerous 
Intoxication. "198 
Although it was perhaps inspired by moral or ethical concerns,'•• 
that the defendant was more than reckless, i.e., that he acted either purposely or knowingly 
with respect to causing death at the time he became intoxicated. 
193 421 u.s. 684 (1975). 
lit 432 u.s. 197 (1977). 
196 See supra note 51. 
196 See generally Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, supra note 22, at 652-55 (discuss-
ing other examples of such codified presumptions). 
197 Current Jaw only requires the state to carry the burden of persuasion for some de-
fenses. See 1 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, supra note 18, § 5. 
1911 See Criminal Law Revision Committee, supra note 167, ~ 263, at 113-14. The proposal 
was rejected. ld. ~ 264, at 114; see also Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] § 330a, translated in G. 
Fletcher, supra note 27, at 847 (providing for up to five years of imprisonment of an actor 
who causes a harm while intoxicated to the point of excuse). 
199 Part of its attractiveness may have been that it avoided the process inherent in Model 
Penal Code § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Intoxication") of "imputing" a culpa-
ble state of mind that the defendant did not have. The imputation struck some commenta-
tors as illogical or immoral. Compare Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All 
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the Smith-Williams approach is a useful device for circumventing 
the constitutional burden-of-persuasion problen1s. Such a maneu-
ver is possible because the constitutional prohibition is based on 
somewhat questionable criteria: allocation to the defendant is 
barred for an element of the offense definition but is permitted for 
an independent "defense."200 By creating a new offense of "Dan-
gerous Intoxication" or "Committing an Offense While Intoxi-
cated," the legislature may control what is defined as an element 
of the offense and what as a defense. The offense might be defined 
as follows: 
DANGEROUS INTOXICATION 
(1) Definition of Offense. An actor who would have been guilty of 
the offense charged or any lesser included offense but for the de-
fense of intoxication negating an element, as provided in Section 
xxx [Intoxication Negating an Element], is guilty of the offense of 
Dangerous Intoxication. 
A subsequent subsection might provide: 
(2) Affirmative Defense. It shall be an affirmative defense to the 
offense of Dangerous Intoxication that the actor proves that at the 
time he was intoxicating himself he did not have the culpability 
required by any offense or lesser included offense for which he 
E.R. 347, 360 (Hailsham, L.J.) (logic requires jury instruction permitting a finding that in-
toxication negates any element of offense) with Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Majewski, 
[1976] 2 All E.R. 142, 157 (Salmon, L.J.) (logical principle that prosecution must prove 
every element of offense cannot prevail where defendant's voluntary intoxication has caused 
the absence of an element) and id. at 166-68 (Edmund-Davies, L.J.) (same); see also id. at 
168-71 (Edmund-Davies, L.J.) (recognizing but rejecting moral objections to conviction ab-
sent required culpable state of mind). 
For discussion of the illogic of conviction absent proof of a required element, see G. Wil-
liams, Criminal Law § 181 (2d ed. 1961); Model Penal Code § 2.08 comment 3 (Tent. Draft 
No. 9, 1959). For a discussion of the moral implication of such a conviction, see J. Smith & 
B. Hogan, Criminal Law 37 (3d ed. 1973) (arguing that the voluntarily intoxicated actors 
who cannot control their conduct should not be punished). It is unprincipled imputation, 
and not imputation itself, however, that is illogical and immoral. See Robinson, Imputed 
Criminal Liability, supra note 22, at 639-42. The imputation that occurs in § 2.08(2) and 
other rules governing voluntary intoxication is no different in function and effect than the 
imputation that occurs in a host of other accepted criminal law rules and doctrines. See id. 
at 611-29. 
200 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 2Hi (state must prove all of the elements included in 
the definition of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but it need not disprove all affirma-
tive defenses related to culpability). 
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gained a defense under Section xxx [Intoxication Negating an 
Element]. 
With this structure, the constitutional burden-of-persuasion re-
quirement would be satisfied, yet liability in intoxication cases of 
failure of proof would be imposed according to the theoretically 
appropriate criterion: the actor's culpable state of mind as to the 
offense at the time of becoming intoxicated. The defendant, more-
over, would have an opportunity, which he now lacks, to escape or 
reduce his liability when appropriate.••• This latter point is signifi-
cant. Although the Patterson Court suggested that it would disap-
prove legislative attempts to shift the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant by gerrymandering the line between offenses and de-
fenses,'•' the Court also suggested that a shift in the burden might 
be permissible when the legislature is also providing a new or ex-
panded defense. 203 
This or similar compromise approaches may solve the difficulties 
of proof, but they substantially exacerbate the complexity prob-
lem. Juries are likely to have trouble applying rules governing such 
technical offenses as "Dangerous Intoxication," which are so artifi-
cial and so foreign to the analysis dictated by their sense of justice. 
1111 In most jurisdictions, the defendant may never use voluntary intoxication to disprove 
recklessness. In others, evidence of voluntary intoxication may be unavailing even to dis-
prove higher degrees of culpability. See supra note 45. 
so2 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210-11. 
203 Id. at 207-08. An interesting question is whether, in deciding that the legislature has 
offered a "new or expanded" defense, the court will consider the general historical availabil-
ity of the defense, or the actual historical availability of the defense in the particular juris-
diction. Hawaii, for example, allows a defendant to use voluntary intoxication to negate 
recklessness. Hawaii Rev. Stat.§ 702-230(1) (1976). If Hawaii and Virginia (which considers 
voluntary intoxication only in capital cases) both passed the legislation outlined above, 
would the Court uphold Virginia's statute while striking down Hawaii's, on the theory that 
Hawaii was not offering the defendant any advantage to offset the shift in burden of proof? 
This result would deter legislators from enacting sweeping reforms for fear that they could 
never make only a partial retreat. 
Outside the failure of proof area, a similar case for constitutional validity might run as 
follows: many jurisdictions deny a general defense if the actor caused the defense conditions. 
See statutes and cases supra notes 8-11, 16-20. Others deny such defenses if the actor was 
"at fault." See statutes and cases supra notes 27, 33. Even in the latter jurisdictions, the 
defendant need perhaps be at fault only as to causing the defense, and not as to the offense 
itself. A proposed statute that creates a new offense, "Creating the Conditions of a De-
fense," but allows an affirmative defense of lack of culpability as to the underlying substan-
tive offense, may well offer such defendants expanded opportunities at exculpation. 
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Conclusion 
There are practical limits on constructing workable criminal law 
doctrine by using our collective sense of justice as a guiding princi-
ple. As long as the theory and doctrine approximate this collective 
sense, however, the limits will be primarily difficulties of proof and 
not complexity. The proof problems may be solved by various evi-
dentiary devices, such as rebuttable presumptions, which do not 
distort the theory. Because such nondistorting evidentiary devices 
appear to be unavailable in the United States, the problems of 
proof can be solved only by devising doctrines that no longer re-
flect our collective sense of justice, and therefore no longer are eas-
ily understood and implemented by juries. It is thus the constitu-
tional constraints on solving the evidentiary problems that 
represent the greatest limitation on translating good theory into 
workable doctrine. Under these constraints, we are condemned to a 
system of substantive criminal law doctrine that is either unjust or 
unworkable. 
